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THE  SPECIFICATION of the money demand  function  has important  impli- 
cations for a number  of macroeconomic  issues. First, if policymakers 
are to be responsible for achieving price stability, they need reliable 
quantitative  estimates  of money  demand.  ' In particular,  if the money de- 
mand  function  is stable, the income elasticity yields the rate of money 
growth  that  is consistent  with long-run  price stability. 
Second, macroeconomic  theorists  need quantitative  estimates  of the 
money demand  function  in order  to determine  the exact predictions  of 
their models. In Keynesian models, for instance, the relative ability  of 
monetary  and fiscal policy to affect the real economy depends on the 
elasticities of the demand  for money. For a given interest elasticity, a 
larger  income elasticity implies a more vertical LM curve; as a result, 
monetary  policy is relatively  more  potent  than  fiscal  policy. In fact, part 
of the debate  between monetarists  and fiscalists  in the 1950s  and 1960s 
was over the "slope"  of the LM curve. Such issues are especially im- 
portant  to many  economists of the 1990s,  who are called upon to assess 
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1. That  economic  research  promotes  "prosperity  and  price  stability"  has always  been 
a primary goal of the Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity.  Readers of BPEA find a 
formal  statement  of this  goal on the first  page  of every volume. 
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the macroeconomic  consequences  of deficit  reduction.  For  other  econo- 
mists who are inclined  to think  in terms  of the general-equilibrium,  real 
business-cycle  model  (which  recently  has begun  to emphasize  monetary 
aspects of the economy), money demand  elasticities are among those 
figures  that need to be replicated  by the equilibrium  conditions  of their 
models. Furthermore,  in such models, money demand  elasticities mat- 
ter in determining  the aggregate  price level and the inflation  rate, given 
the growth  rate of money. Classical  economists may also argue  that the 
elasticities  are important  in determining  the optimal  seigniorage  policy. 
Finally, both classical economists and Keynesians need to worry 
about  the reasons why people hold money. That is, they need a theory 
of money demand  that  can be tested against  the data. One of the predic- 
tions of such a theory will be the elasticity of money demand  with re- 
spect to income and the interest  rate. Some models will further  predict 
that  the elasticities are structural  and, therefore,  stable. Hence the size 
and stability  of the money demand  elasticities  can be seen as tests of the 
implications  of different  theories. 
Economists  disagree  about  the size of the income elasticity  of money 
demand. At the theoretical level, the predicted elasticities range be- 
tween one-third  and one: a strict interpretation  of the Baumol-Tobin 
model2  of the transactions  demand  for money  predicts  an  income  elastic- 
ity of one-half.  This is true  if transaction  costs are  thought  to be indepen- 
dent of income. This assumption,  however, is not completely  realistic. 
For instance, if transaction  costs are related  to the time needed to go to 
the bank, then the cost is related to the wage rate, which, in turn, will 
be positively correlated  with the aggregate  level of income. The overall 
income elasticity would in this case be greater  than one-half.3  The sto- 
chastic version of the model (developed by Merton Miller  and Daniel 
Orr)  reduces  the prediction  to about  one-third.4  The elasticity  predicted 
by the popular  "cash-in-advance"  model  is unity.5 
At the empirical  level, the elasticity  estimates  are even more  erratic.6 
2.  See Baumol  (1952)  and  Tobin  (1956). 
3. Karni  (1973). 
4.  Miller  and  Orr  (1966). 
5. See Barro  and  Fischer  (1976)  for a survey  of theories  of money  demand. 
6. Many  empirical  studies  of money  demand  exist; their  estimates  vary  widely. An il- 
lustrative,  but  not exhaustive,  list would  include  Friedman  (1959),  Meltzer  (1963a,  1963b), 
Laidler  (1985),  Goldfeld  (1973, 1976),  Judd  and  Scadding  (1982),  Lucas (1988),  and  Braun 
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They seem sensitive to the choice of sample  period, to the exact func- 
tional  form and number  of lags, and to the inclusion  and precise defini- 
tion of the interest  rate  variable.  Typical  problems  arise  from  the poten- 
tial simultaneity  bias of money supply and money demand;  from the 
correlation  of income and  transaction  technologies  over time  ;7 from  the 
potential  instability  of the coefficients;  and  from  possible nonstationari- 
ties (which  would dictate whether  regressions  should  be run using first 
differences,  using  levels with  time trends,  or using  trends  with a number 
of breaks). 
That the money demand  function is stable over time is a standard 
identifying  assumption,  yet there is no shortage  of evidence to the con- 
trary.  Benjamin  Friedman  and Kenneth  Kuttner  insist that  for 1970-90, 
time-series  data  reveal  no "close or reliable  relationship  between money 
and  nonfinancial  economic activity."  8 
In this paper, we argue that these and other problems  are avoided 
when money demand is  estimated cross-sectionally. We  estimate 
money demand  functions  using cross sections of U.S. states from 1929 
to 1990  and  arrive  at a number  of interesting  conclusions. First,  from  our 
preferred  equations, we find  that the income elasticity of both demand 
deposits and a broader  measure  of money lies between 1.3 and 1.5 for 
the entire  period  of 1929-90. Second, year-by-year  cross-sectional  esti- 
mates  of the income elasticity  for these two measures  are  almost  always 
well above 1.0 during  this long period-which includes  both  the Depres- 
sion and World War 11-and  do not differ individually  from the esti- 
mates  for the sample  period  as a whole. Third,  we conclude  that  income 
per capita  is a better scale variable  than  consumption,  although  the em- 
pirical  estimates do not depend significantly  on the choice of the scale 
variable.  Finally,  during  some time periods,  we find  that  agricultural  re- 
gions have demanded  more money than would be predicted  given their 
incomes. 
The paper  is organized  as follows. The first  section describes  our  data 
set, which measures  various  bank  deposits for 48 U.S. states from 1929 
to 1990. The deposit data are used to construct a narrow  measure of 
7. Because  of its unobservable  nature,  financial  technology  is commonly  thrown  into 
the error  term.  To the extent that  income  is positively  correlated  with technology  (which 
affects  the  demand  for money  negatively),  the estimates  of the income  elasticity  are  biased 
downward. 
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money (which  we call MX  1), as well as a broader  measure  (MX2).  The 
second section argues  that  time-series  estimation  of money demand  en- 
counters a number  of problems  that can be successfully solved using 
cross-sectional analysis. In the third section, we summarize  previous 
findings  in the literature.  The fourth  section presents  the empirical  esti- 
mates. In the fifth  section, we discuss the "shifts"  in the money demand 
function.  The final  section summarizes  our main  findings,  discusses the 
relevance  of our  estimates  to macroeconomic  policy, and offers conjec- 
tures  about  the reasons  for income elasticities  above one. 
Data: Sources and Definitions 
We have compiled data on two concepts of money-which  we call 
MX1  and  MX2-for  48 states. Our  sample  period  is 1929-90.  In this first 
section, we review conventional definitions  of money for the United 
States as a whole. We then explain  our state money data. We conclude 
the section by describing other variables included in the empirical 
analysis. 
U.S.  Money Aggregates 
For the United States, four aggregate  definitions  of money are com- 
mon: MO  (the monetary  base), Ml,  M2, and M3. Currency,  together 
with  reserves, constitutes  the monetary  base. MI is the sum  of currency, 
traveler's checks, demand  deposits and, after the 1980s, other check- 
able deposits. MI, savings deposits, small time deposits, overnight  re- 
purchase  agreements,  overnight  Eurodollars  and money market  mutual 
funds (excluding  institution-only  funds) constitute M2. M3 is M2 plus 
other "less liquid"  financial  assets.9 
State  Money Aggregates 
Because currency  data  are not available  by state, it is very difficult  to 
measure  the monetary  base at the state level. However, aggregate  U.S. 
data suggest that broader  aggregates  can be approximated  by deposit 
data:  in 1987,  for instance,  currency  constituted  only 26 percent  of M1.  10 
Hence we collect and  analyze deposit  data  by state. 
9.  Barro  (1990,  pp. 427-29). 
10. Barro  (1990,  p. 428). Casey B. Mulligan  and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  289 
In each year since 1950,  the Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation 
(FDIC)  has surveyed  all  banks. Each  bank  has reported  the composition 
of its deposits, as well as a profile  of its depositors. Thus a bank's "call 
report"  reveals amounts  owed in the form of demand  deposits, savings 
deposits, and time deposits. The reports also show the importance  of 
various  depositor  groups:  individuals,  partnerships,  and corporations; 
federal government  agencies; state and local governments;  and other 
banking  institutions. Before 1950, similar  surveys were conducted by 
state governments  or by the Federal  Reserve.  "  I 
The FDIC  summed  various  subsets  of banks  and  reported  state  aggre- 
gates for various types of deposits. For 1950-57, all operating  banks 
were included in the aggregates.  After 1957, only FDIC-insured  com- 
mercial  banks  were included;  mutual  savings  banks  or uninsured  banks 
were excluded.  12 Demand  deposit measures  by state were compiled  by 
the Federal Reserve for 1929-49, often using individual  state govern- 
ment sources. The Federal  Reserve totals included  all banks. 
Today, a deposit is considered  to be in a state if the banking  branch 
at which the deposit is made is located in that state, regardless  of the 
location of the main  office.'3  Before 1981,  what mattered  was the loca- 
tion of the main  office. 
For 1929-87,  our  narrow  measure  of money, MXl, is demand  depos- 
its held at banks  by individuals,  partnerships,  and  corporations.'4 After 
11. For FDIC  surveys, see FDIC,  Banks  and  Branches  Data Book;  Data Book, Oper- 
ating  Banks  and  Branches;  Bank  Operating  Statistics;  Statistics  on Banking;  and  Assets, 
Liabilities,  and Capital  Accounts  of Commercial  and  Mutual  Savings  Banks.  For  Federal 
Reserve  surveys,  see Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System  (1959). 
12. In 1973,  99.1 percent  of demand  deposits in the United States were liabilities  of 
FDIC-insured  commercial  banks. FDIC (1973,  table 6, p. 132).  In 1983,  the fraction  had 
fallen  to 98.6 percent.  FDIC,  Data Book, Operating,  Banks  and  Branches:  June  30, 1983, 
table 1. 
13. According  to the FDIC, a branch  is "any  office or facility  of a bank,  including  its 
main  office, at which  deposits  are  received,  checks  paid,  or money  lent, even though  some 
of these may  not  be defined  as branches  by State  laws. A branch  includes,  but  is not  limited 
to all of the following:  drive-in  facilities,  seasonal  offices  on military  bases or government 
installations;  paying/receiving  stations  or units, and non-deposit  offices." (FDIC  Banks 
and  Branches  Data Book,  June  30, 1984).  Branches  do not  include  electronic  fund  transfer 
units  and  customer  bank  communication  terminals. 
14. Not included  as individuals,  partnership,  or corporations  (IPCs)  are federal  gov- 
ernment  agencies  and  other  banks.  State  and  local  governments  also are  not included,  ex- 
cept in the 1929-49  period.  Deposits  held  by mutual  savings  banks  at FDIC-insured  com- 
mercial  banks  are  sometimes  included  in the IPC  total  during  the 1958-87  period.  As noted 
above, state aggregates  include  deposits owed by all banks  for 1929-57, but only those 
owed by FDIC-insured  commercial  banks  for 1958-90. 290  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure 1.  Comparing Ml and State-aggregated Demand Deposits (MX1), 1929-90 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on  Friedman and Schwartz  (1963); Statistical  Abstract  of the  United States 
1991, p. 7; and other sources  listed in appendix 2. MXI is state-aggregated demand deposits  as described  in the text. 
MXI  and Ml  are deflated using  1982 as the base  year and converted  into per capita values to remove  the common 
trend in population.  MXI and the population variable are based on aggregated data from 48 states,  excluding  Alaska 
and Hawaii. 
1987,  we use "non-interest-bearing  deposits,"  regardless  of the deposi- 
tor. Our  broad  measure,  MX2, includes  all deposits  held  at insured  com- 
mercial  banks. MX2  includes  savings  and  time  deposits, including  those 
held by public  entities. Inconsistencies  in the types of banks surveyed 
for MX1  also apply  to MX2. 
We noted  above some minor  inconsistencies  in the definitions  of MX  I 
and MX2 over time. Mutual  savings  banks  may or may not be counted, 
government  bank  deposits  are sometimes  counted,  and  surveys  vary  be- 
tween June and December. In every instance of a definitional  change 
(which occurred in 1950, 1958, 1984, and 1988), we had overlapping 
data. We adjusted  levels of four series accordingly.  Most importantly, 
we kept definitions  consistent cross-sectionally. 
Figures 1  and  2 sum  our  measures  of money-MX1  and  MX2-for  all 
48 states and  compares  them  with  two similar  Federal  Reserve  concepts, 
MI and  M2.  15 We  deflate  the  four  series  and  divide  by the U. S. population 
15. MX1  and  MX2  exclude  Alaska  and  Hawaii. Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  291 
Figure 2.  Comparing M2 and State-aggregated Total Deposits (MX2), 1929-90 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963);  Statistical  Abstract  of the Uniited States 
1991,  p. 7; and  other  sources  listed  in appendix  2. MX2  is state-aggregated  demand  deposits  as described  in the text. 
MX2  and M2 are deflated  using 1982  as the base year  and converted  into per capita  values  to remove  the common 
trend  in population.  MX2  and  the population  variable  are based  on aggregated  data  from  48 states, excluding  Alaska 
and Hawaii. 
to remove the common  trend.'6  Of course, because MI and M2 include 
currency,  the levels of M  I and  M2  are  greater  than  the levels of MX  I and 
MX2, respectively. The figure shows that year-to-year  variations  are 
fairly  similar  when  MI is compared  with  MX  1 and  when M2  is compared 
with MX2. The main exception to this observation  occurs in the early 
1980s,  when demand  deposits dropped  more sharply  than  Ml. MX1  and 
MI have a correlation  of 0.80 for the full sample  and one of 0.97 when 
the 1980s  are  excluded.  The  main  difference  between  Ml and  MX1  during 
the 1980s  was probably  caused by the introduction  of NOW accounts 
and other checkable deposits that are part  of MI but not part  of MX1. 
MX2 and M2 have a correlation  over the full sample  of 0.99. 
Dispersion  of  Velocity and Money per Capita 
In this section, we argue  that the cross-sectional  variation  of money 
is sufficiently  large to justify cross-sectional econometric analysis. In 
16. For  the U.S. population  and  for MX1  and  MX2,  we use the sum  over the 48 states, 
excluding  Alaska  and  Hawaii. 292  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
Figure 3.  Dispersion of State Demand Deposits,  1929-90 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  using  data  listed  in  appendix  2. Standard  deviations  are  from  cross-sectional  estimates 
of the log of state  demand  deposits  (MXI)  per capita  and log MXI velocity. 
other words, states are not simply miniature  replicas of the United 
States as a whole. 
Figure  3 graphs  the dispersion  of state demand  deposits  for 1929-90. 
The dashed line plots the unweighted,  cross-sectional standard  devia- 
tion of log MX  1 per capita  for 48 states. This  measure  is very high  during 
the Depression  and through  World  War  II (denoted  hereafter  as the De- 
pression-War  period), peaking  at nearly  0.65. After World  War  II, dis- 
persion diminishes  steadily until the early 1970s.  From 1973  to 1980,  it 
steadily increases. Note that dispersion  is never below 0.23. The solid 
line in figure  3 presents  dispersion  of the log of MX1  velocity (also calcu- 
lated as the unweighted,  cross-sectional standard  deviation of the log 
MXI velocity for the 48 states). The pattern  is quite similar  to that of 
MX1  per capita, and  the measure  never  falls below 0.20. 
Figure  4 presents the cross-sectional  dispersion  of our broader  mea- 
sure  of money, MX2.17  The dispersion  of MX2  per capita  follows a simi- 
lar  pattern  to that  of MX1;  it is always above 0.25. The dispersion  of the 
log of velocity (shown  as a solid  line)  is a bit smaller;  it has a lower bound 
of 0.21. 
17. One notable  outlier  occurs in our MX2  data. Delaware  experiences  an unusually 
rapid  expansion  of MX2  during  the 1980s. Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  293 
Figure 4.  Dispersion of State Total Demand Deposits,  1929-90 
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Source:  Authors' calculations using data listed in appendix 2. Standard deviations are from cross-sectional  estimates 
of the log of total state demand deposits  (MX2) per capita and log MXI  velocity. 
As a comparison,  the U.S. aggregate  time series for log MX1  per cap- 
ita at constant  prices has a standard  deviation  of 0.26 from 1929  to 1990. 
When the Depression-War  period is excluded, the figure is 0.215.18 
Hence the cross-sectional  variation  of log MX1 is quite comparable  to 
the U.S. time-series  variation.  19  The time-series  dispersion  of aggregate 
U.S.  (log) MX2 velocity is a mere 0.14 for 1929-90 and is 0.08 for 
1947-90.20 Hence the cross-sectional  variation  in our  data  is large. 
18. The  corresponding  figures  for U.S. log MX1  velocity  are  0.49 for 1929-90  and  0.48 
for 1947-90. 
19. Time-series  variation  for individual  states  is similar  to that  for the United  States  as 
a whole. Constant-price,  standard  deviations  of log MX1 per capita  range  from  0.18 for 
New Jersey  to 0.60 for Arizona  and  North  Dakota.  On average,  they are  0.38. The corre- 
sponding  figures  for log MX1  velocity average  0.45 and  range  from  0.36 for Florida,  Ver- 
mont,  and  West  Virginia  to 0.59 for Delaware. 
20. Like the U.S. aggregate,  time-series  variation  of MX2  for individual  states is low. 
Excluding  Delaware's  standard  deviation  of 0.40, standard  deviations  of (log)  MX2  veloc- 
ity range  from  0.09  for Indiana,  Louisiana,  and  Tennessee  to 0.28  for Maryland  and  South 
Dakota.  On  average,  they are  0.16. The corresponding  figures  for log MX2  per  capita,  us- 
ing constant  prices, average  0.47. They range  from  0.16 for California  to 0.78 for South 
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Other Variables 
Our  primary  scale or transactions  concept will be personal  income, 
although  in part  of our  analysis  we will also consider  "consumption,"  as 
measured  by retail  sales. The data set includes  annual  observations  for 
48 states compiled  by the Bureau  of Economic Analysis (BEA).21 The 
retail  sales series differs  from  a broad  measure  of consumption  because 
it excludes services. However, it includes  consumer  durables  and other 
forms of nonfood consumption  that are excluded from bodies of data 
such as the University  of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
which other  researchers  have used. 
Population  density and agriculture's  share of personal income are 
used to capture  other  state-specific  determinants  of money demand.  We 
include  an agricultural  variable  as an attempt  to capture  regional  differ- 
ences in prices or transaction  technologies.  In particular,  we would like 
to allow  for the possibility  that  new transaction  technologies  may slowly 
diffuse  from urban  to more rural  areas. Hence at a given point in time, 
different states may be undergoing  different  degrees of technological 
progress.  However, our  annual  agricultural  income series has too much 
high-frequency  variation  to capture our notion of technological  diffu- 
sion. We therefore  compute  five-year  averages  of agriculture's  share  of 
personal  income. Population  and area  are taken  from  the Bureau  of the 
Census'  Current Population  Report and the Statistical  Abstract of the 
United States,  respectively. 
For our  time-series  analysis, MX1, MX2, personal  income, and  retail 
sales are expressed in constant prices. We deflated  using the U.S. im- 
plicit price deflator  for personal consumption  expenditure  taken from 
the Economic Report of the President. 
Time-Series  Problems and Cross-Sectional  Solutions 
Traditionally,  money demand equations have been estimated with 
time-series data.22  The constant elasticity money demand equation 
given below is typical  of those used in time-series  analyses: 
(1)  logm,  =  ot +  3logy, -  blogR,  +  et. 
21. For retail  sales the available  years are: 1929, 1935, 1939, 1948, 1954, 1958, 1963, 
1967,  1972,  1977,  1982,  1984,  1987,  and 1989.  A Census of Retail Trade was not conducted 
every year. 
22. See, for example,  the references  listed  in footnote  6. Casey B. Mulligan  and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  295 
In this specification,  y is real  per-capita  output,  R is an interest  rate, and 
m is real  money balances  per capita. 
Time-Series Problems 
Several difficult  issues arise in examining  this type of specification. 
Most  of these can be overcome  by estimating  money  demand  with  cross- 
sectional  data. 
First, what is the relevant  interest  rate?  Inventory  models of money 
demand  such as those by Baumol  and  Tobin  predict  that  the interest  rate 
relevant  for money demand  is the return  on an alternative,  less liquid 
asset.23  For demand  deposits, the appropriate  asset might  be Treasury 
bills. For a broader  concept of money, corporate  bonds  or equities  might 
be appropriate. 
Time-series  estimates are somewhat  sensitive to the choice of an in- 
terest  rate. In table 1, we display  some time-series  regressions  of money 
demand (using U.S. aggregates)  for 1932-90. When the Treasury  bill 
rate is used and the equation  is expressed in first differences, the esti- 
mated income elasticity is 1.32. However, when the Treasury  bill rate 
is replaced  by Moody's Aaa corporate  bond rate, the elasticity falls to 
0.94.24 
Second, it is difficult  to measure  "money"  consistently over time. It 
can be persuasively  argued  that 50 years ago, MI was a good definition 
of money, but  with technological  advances  and  financial  deregulation,  a 
broader  concept of money is more appropriate  today. Although some 
attempts  have been made to construct a consistent time series for the 
United States, a cross-sectional  analysis  can make  use of a more  consis- 
tent definition  for money. 
Third, how can the analysis deal with both serial correlation  of the 
error  term and with nonstationarity?  Time-series  estimates  of equation 
1 yield serially correlated  errors. According  to Robert Lucas, various 
23. Baumol  (1952)  and  Tobin  (1956). 
24. The first  three  parts  of table 1 use the sum  of all states' MX1  for every year. As a 
comparison,  the last part  of table 1  runs  the same  regressions  over the same  time  period  as 
the others,  but  uses M  1. For 1959-90,  M  I is taken  from  the Economic  Report  of the  Presi- 
dent,  and  for 1929-58,  MI is taken  from  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963).  Note that  the esti- 
mated  elasticities  for  MI are  similar.  In particular,  note that  the point  estimates  seem quite 
sensitive  to the choice of interest  rate. In all sections of table 1, substituting  the level of 
interest  rates  for the log of the interest  rate does not seem to have much  impact  on the 
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Table 1. Time-series  Estimates  with MX1  and Ml Aggregates 
Aggregate 
and  Equation  Type of  Income  Interest 
period  form  interest rate  elasticity  elasticity 
MXl,  Differenced  None  1.04  ... 
1932-90  (0.18) 
Tbill  1.32  -0.04 
(0.18)  (0.01) 
Commercial  paper  1.11  -0.09 
(0.16)  (0.03) 
Corporate  bond  0.94  - 0.38 
(0.14)  (0.07) 
Trend  None  2.71  ... 
(0.24)  ... 
Tbill  2.66  0.03 
(0.03)  (0.02) 
Commercial  paper  2.80  0.06 
(0.25)  (0.05) 
Corporate  bond  2.11  -0.34 
(0.23)  (0.07) 
Level  None  -0.01  ... 
(0.08)  ... 
Tbill  0.02  -0.01 
(0.15)  (0.04) 
Commercial  paper  0.42  -0.22 
(0.15)  (0.06) 
Corporate  bond  0.47  -0.65 
(0.12)  (0.06) 
MX1,  Differenced  None  0.97  ... 
1932-79  (0.16)  ... 
Tbill  1.21  -0.04 
(0.16)  (0.01) 
Commercial  paper  1.03  -0.08 
(0.15)  (0.03) 
Corporate  bond  0.88  - 0.38 
(0.14)  (0.08) 
Trend  None  2.12  ... 
(0.20)  ... 
Tbill  2.13  -0.01 
(0.20)  (0.02) 
Commercial  paper  1.88  -0.09 
(0.23)  (0.05) 
Corporate  bond  1.35  -0.43 
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Table 1.  (continued) 
Aggregate 
and  Equation  Type of  Income  Interest 
period  form  interest rate  elasticity  elasticity 
MX1,  Differenced  None  1.25  ... 
1947-90  (0.35)  ... 
Tbill  1.68  -0.08 
(0.33)  (0.02) 
Commercial  paper  1.73  -0.10 
(0.33)  (0.03) 
Corporate  bond  1.34  -0.31 
(0.28)  (0.06) 
Trend  None  2.76  ... 
(0.31)  ... 
Tbill  2.66  0.03 
(0.33)  (0.03) 
Commercial  paper  2.69  0.02 
(0.34)  (0.04) 
Corporate  bond  2.83  -0.03 
(0.34)  (0.07) 
Ml,  Differenced  None  0.91  ... 
1932-90  (0.20)  ... 
Tbill  1.42  -0.07 
(0.16)  (0.01) 
Commercial  paper  1.04  -0.11 
(0.17)  (0.02) 
Corporate  bond  0.84  -0.35 
(0.16)  (0.07) 
Trend  None  2.32  ... 
(0.21)  ... 
Tbill  2.38  -0.04 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
Commercial  paper  2.08  -0.15 
(0.19)  (0.04) 
Corporate  bond  1.50  -0.46 
(0.13)  (0.04) 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  data  listed in appendix  2. The basic regression  follows  equation  I in the text 
and takes the form  log m, = a  +  ,log y, -  blog  R, +  e,. All variables  draw  on annual  data  and are expressed  in 
logarithms.  The dependent  variable  is our measure  of demand  deposits  summed  over the 48 states;  it is differenced 
when applicable.  The income variable  is personal  income summed  over the 48 states. Both are deflated  by the 
personal  consumpation  deflator.  Standard  errors  are shown in parentheses.  Results  for up to three  equation  forms 
are reported.  "Trend"  means  that  a time  trend  was included  as an explanatory  variable.  "Differenced"  means  that 
equation  I was estimated  in first  differences.  "Level" means  no trend  was used. 298  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
correction  procedures  obtain "wildly  erratic  elasticity estimates."25  A 
related  problem  is the potential  nonstationarity  of various  series. 
Table 1 illustrates  some of the problems.  When  a differenced  money 
demand  equation  is estimated  in a time series with U.S. aggregates,  the 
income elasticity is fairly  near unity.26  Elasticities  fall to less than one- 
half when the differenced  specification  is replaced  by a level specifica- 
tion. Adding  a time trend  variable  to the level specification  delivers  esti- 
mated  elasticities  of nearly  three! 
Fourth,  is the money  demand  function  stable?  Many  econometricians 
have argued  that U.S. money demand  is not stable, meaning  that either 
the intercept  or the slope coefficients  in the money demand  equation,  or 
both, change over time.27  The next two time periods in table 1 suggest 
some instability  in money demand. When the 1980s  are dropped  from 
the 1932-90 sample  period, income elasticity estimates fall from about 
2.7 (as seen in the entire  period)  to about  2.0 when  the trend  specification 
is used. Dropping  the Depression-War  period  tends to increase  income 
elasticity estimates under  a differenced  specification;  the income elas- 
ticities here are about 1.5. 
Of course, time-series estimates of money demand  assume that the 
money demand  coefficients are constant over time. A cross-sectional 
approach  would instead assume geographical  similarities  in money de- 
mand, at least once certain  conditioning  variables  were held constant. 
The individual  cross-sectional  estimates  can be used to test the stability 
of the coefficients  over time. 
Fifth, if the level of technology  is increasing  with  the level of income, 
how can the analysis deal with the bias that the omission of technology 
introduces into the estimated income elasticities? Correlation  of the 
money demand  disturbance  with real  income  could very well be the rea- 
son behind  the apparent  instability  of the time-series  estimates  of the in- 
come elasticity. The correlation  between financial  innovation  and in- 
come growth  may  vary  over time;  this will introduce  different  degrees  of 
bias in different  time periods. Observing  the instability  of the estimated 
25. Lucas  (1988,  p. 140,  footnote  2). 
26. In table 1, we made  no attempt  to replicate  any of the previous  time-series  studies 
of money demand.  In particular,  we did not correct  for serial  correlation,  we did not in- 
clude lagged  money (except for the case when we used first  differences),  and we did not 
perform  any of the sophisticated  econometric  techniques  usually  used in this literature. 
27. See Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1992)  and  Braun  and  Christiano  (1992). Casey B. Mulligan  and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  299 
elasticities, the time-series  researcher  may be led to think  that the true 
elasticities  are unstable  when they are not. 
Sixth, money demand  may be a function  of transactions  or of some 
other variable  that can be only partially  approximated  by income (or 
consumption).  It may  be that, in the long run,  the true  scale variable  and 
income  move very closely together,  while  in the short  run,  income  is pol- 
luted  by all kinds of noise that  have nothing  to do with money demand. 
This suggests using very long-run  time-series  data (as Milton  Friedman 
did in his 1959 study) or using cross-sectional state data.28  The slow 
process of convergence  documented  by Robert  Barro  and Xavier Sala- 
i-Martin  indicates  that cross-state  income differentials  are quite  perma- 
nent.29  As a result,  they are  likely  to be a much  better  measure  of the true 
transactions-scale  variable. 
Finally,  as Lucas  has pointed  out, "shifts"  in the money  demand  func- 
tion can be associated with changes in the stochastic environment.30  In 
principle,  it is difficult  to explain  why optimizing  agents  living in differ- 
ent states should  use drastically  different  forecasting  rules,  which  in turn 
makes it difficult  to pinpoint  important  geographical  differences  in the 
stochastic environment.  On the other hand, optimizing  agents would 
probably  not apply  the same  forecasting  rules in the 1980s  as they did in 
the 1930s.  This is another  reason why the underlying  parameters  of the 
money demand function could, in principle, be best estimated using 
cross-sectional  data. 
Three Plausible  Assumptions 
To avoid having  to solve the difficult  problems  posed above, the in- 
come elasticity  of money  demand  can  be estimated  using  cross-sectional 
data, if three plausible assumptions are made about regions of the 
United States.3' 
28. Friedman  (1959). 
29. Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1991). 
30. Lucas  (1988). 
31. Some of the problems  are solved by the mere  use of state data. For instance,  be- 
cause states  do not print  their  own money, the demand/supply  simultaneity  problem  aris- 
ing  from  monetary  policy  at the federal  level disappears.  As we argued  above, our  data  set 
contains  measures  of money  that  are  consistent  across  states  for  every  year.  Finally,  using 
a cross section  eliminates  the worry  about  the stationarity,  integration,  and  cointegration 
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The first assumption  is that the interest rate relevant  for money de- 
mand-whether it is the Treasury  bill  rate, the Aaa corporate  bond  rate, 
or the return  on some other  asset-is  the same  for every state, or at least 
uncorrelated  with income. Hence for every cross section, the interest 
rate effect is subsumed  in the constant  term. This assumption  is plaus- 
ible if it is thought  that  everybody  in the United States has access to the 
same capital  market. 
It could be argued  that this assumption  is not plausible  and that low- 
income regions  tend to have higher  interest  rates  because some fraction 
of their capital stock cannot be used as collateral  in nationwide  credit 
transactions.  If true, this would tend to bias the income elasticity up- 
ward. However, in the appendix  we show that the magnitude  of such a 
bias is likely  to be smaller  than  0.125. Note that  the existence of different 
tax treatments  of interest  income will tend to introduce  different  after- 
tax interest  rates  across states, even if everybody  in the country  can buy 
the same assets (say, Treasury  bills). However, to introduce an im- 
portant  bias into  our  estimates,  tax differentials  in interest  income  would 
have to be highly  correlated  with income. We know of no evidence sup- 
porting  such a hypothesis. 
The second assumption  is that the price level is the same in every 
state, or at least that it is uncorrelated  with the level of income. Again, 
a U.S.-wide price  level is subsumed  in the constant  term  for every cross 
section. 
We make this assumption  because data on state price levels are not 
available. One reasonable  conjecture  is that richer states tend to have 
higher  price levels. If this were the case, our assumption  of constant  re- 
gional  prices would introduce  a term (1 -  I)pi in the error  term  (where 
i  is the true income elasticity of money demand  and  p is the price level 
of state i). The correlation  between the explanatory  variable  and  the er- 
ror term would introduce  a bias in our estimates. If the coefficient  of a 
regression  of state prices on state real income is denoted by s, the esti- 
mated  income  elasticity  of money demand  would  be 13  = I +  [(1 -  ,B)s/ 
(1 + s)]. Note that  the bias introduced  by the omission is positive when 
3  < 1  and  negative  when ,  > 1. Furthermore,  the omission  of state  price 
levels biases the estimates  of the income  elasticity  of money demand  to- 
ward  one, but it never biases it so much  that it overshoots one.32 
32. In the empirical  section, we show that our estimated  elasticities  are larger  than 
one. The reasoning  above suggests  that  the omission  of a state price  variable  is not induc- 
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Our third assumption  is that at any particular  date, the money de- 
mand  functions  are  the same in every state. In the empirical  section, we 
allow for the possibility of different states having different levels of 
transactions  technology (and, therefore, different  constant terms) at a 
given moment  in time. However, we impose the same income elasticity 
for all states at a point in time (although  we allow for these income elas- 
ticities to differ  over time). 
This assumption  is critical, and there are reasons to believe that it 
may not be realistic. States do not have uniform  banking  laws. Some 
states permit nonbank  entities to provide transaction  services, while 
other states have discouraged  savings and loan institutions  and credit 
unions from providing  transaction  accounts. Some states-most  nota- 
bly New York-specialize  in providing  banking  services to out-of-state 
residents. Such geographical  banking  differences  can be interpreted  as 
violations of assumption  3: there are cross-sectional  differences  in the 
level of the money demand  function. Because we cannot say a priori 
how the differences  are correlated  with income, we cannot  place a sign 
on the bias of our  income  elasticity  estimates. For example,  it is possible 
that the richer states, because they have more professional workers, 
tend to dominate  the banking  industry. Our data set would therefore 
show more  deposits in a rich state than  its residents  would  demand;  thus 
our income elasticity estimates would be biased upward.  On the other 
hand,  it can be argued  that  richer  states can more  readily  implement  the 
newest transaction  technologies, which allow agents to economize on 
their cash balances. This second effect would tend to bias our income 
elasticities  downward. 
Our regression analysis attempts to assess the quantitative  impor- 
tance of these three assumptions.  In some specifications,  we try to cap- 
ture the differing  degrees of financial  sophistication  by introducing  the 
share  of income originating  in the agricultural  sector as an explanatory 
variable.  This  is meant  to capture  the  possibility  that  technology  diffuses 
slowly from  urban  to rural  areas. Some of our other specifications  use a 
state's population  density as an alternative  to the agricultural  variable. 
To the extent that geographical  differences  in price levels, financial 
sophistication,  banking  industries,  and banking  laws persist over time, 
state fixed-effects  estimated  in a pooled regression  should mitigate  the 
bias of our  income  elasticity  estimates. A comparison  of income  elastic- 
ity estimates  obtained  with and  without  state fixed-effects  will therefore 
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Under our assumptions,  a constant elasticity money demand  equa- 
tion for period  t is 
(2)  log Mi, = cx,  + kli  +  , log Yi,  + w Zit + Eit, 
for i =  AL, AZ, . ..  WY and t =  1929, 1930 . ..  1990. In this equation, 
M is nominal  money per capita, Y  is per capita nominal  income, and Z 
is a vector of state variables  such as population,33  population  density, 
agricultural  sector's share of income, and regional  dummies. Nominal 
money is appropriate  if all states have the same price level since, as we 
have already  argued,  the price level is subsumed  by the constant term 
Ott.  Some of our empirical  analysis will allow for state fixed-effects. All 
of our regressions  will allow for time effects. 
In conclusion, it may be preferable  to estimate  money demand  func- 
tions using cross-sectional  data, rather  than time-series  data. First, in- 
terest rates do not appear  in a cross-sectional  regression, so the econo- 
metrician can estimate the income elasticity without settling on  a 
particular  interest  rate series. Second, it is easier to consistently  define 
money in a cross section. Third, the cross-sectional approach  conve- 
niently sidesteps some difficult  time-series  questions such as, is money 
demand  stable?  or what are the time-series  properties  of the money de- 
mand errors? While avoiding these issues, a cross-sectional analysis 
permits us to estimate the income elasticity of the demand  for money 
and  to examine  the stability  of those estimates  over time. 
Our cross-sectional  approach,  however, also has drawbacks.  First, 
currency  is excluded. Second, the census data  upon  which  our  series are 
based in some instances count only a subpopulation,  such as FDIC-in- 
sured  commercial  banks.  Third,  we rely  on the geographical  similarity  of 
money demand  functions,  although  we permit  money  demand  to change 
over time. Fourth, to the extent that state income differentials  vanish 
slowly over time  (as Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  demonstrate  they do),34  our 
estimates are closer to what time-series  analysts call "long-run  elastic- 
ities." Hence our  analysis  is silent  as far  as short-run  elasticities  are  con- 
cerned. As we argued  in the previous section, however, this may be 
more  of an advantage  than  a disadvantage. 
There  are some criteria  for which time-series  and cross-sectional  ap- 
proaches  cannot  be ranked  a priori.  For instance, income  can have tran- 
33. We also include  population  in an attempt  to correct  for any aggregation  bias. 
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sitory components  in both a time-series  and a cross-sectional  sense. If 
permanent  income determines  money demand,  then the income elastic- 
ity obtained  with  actual  income  will be biased  downward.  Actual  income 
is a noisy proxy for permanent  income.35  An opposing upward bias 
would  result  if money  is a store  of value during  periods  of high  transitory 
income. Based on some of our results, we will conclude that transitory 
components  of income are not quantitatively  problematic  for our cross- 
sectional  estimates  of money demand. 
A Literature Review 
A number of studies in the 1960s examined money demand with 
cross-sectional data. Allan Meltzer's 1963 study of cross sections of 
business  firms  in different  sectors  for different  years  contains  126  regres- 
sions. Meltzer's  point  estimates  of the sales elasticity  of money demand 
range  from  0.88 to 1.27, with the bulk  of them (100  of 126)  above one.36 
Edgar  Feige's 1963  doctoral  thesis utilizes state  deposit  data  spanning 
eleven years (1949-59). Although  the focus of his work is on the cross- 
price elasticities of the demand  for commercial  bank deposits, he does 
offer  some estimates  of the income  elasticity, and  they are  close to one.37 
There  are two reasons  to believe that  his estimates  are too low. First, 
he does not allow for time effects. Thus the time-series  problems  and 
biases we highlighted  in the previous section apply  to his analysis. This 
is particularly  true when he introduces  a large  number  of regional  dum- 
mies, which remove the cross-sectional variation and leave only the 
time-series variation. Second, as we will note in the next section, the 
1950s  are somewhat  unusual,  perhaps  because they were an era of in- 
creasing  financial  sophistication  and  financial  innovations  diffused  from 
urban  (richer)  areas to rural  (poorer)  areas. This tends to bias the esti- 
mates  of the income  elasticity  downward.  Once we introduce  some con- 
ditioning  variables  to proxy  for this  phenomenon-which Feige does not 
do-our  estimates for the  1950s coincide with those for the other 
decades. 
35.  See Friedman (1959). 
36.  Meltzer (1963b, table 1, p. 41 1). 
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Philip  B. Hartley,  Tong  Hun Lee, and  Bruce  C. Cohen  run  similar  re- 
gressions for the same time period as Feige.38  When they do not intro- 
duce large numbers  of regional  dummies  (so the cross-sectional  varia- 
tion is left intact), the estimated income elasticities are significantly 
larger  than one. When they introduce  a large number  of regional  dum- 
mies, the estimates  fall below one. None of the studies includes  time ef- 
fects. 
In a 1974  study, Feige introduces  time  effects in one regression  for the 
period 1949-65.39  The problem  is that he also introduces  state effects. 
(He never runs a regression  with time effects and  no state effects.) 
We think that income elasticities that are estimated together with 
state effects in such a short sample are troublesome  for two reasons. 
First, as Feige notes in his thesis, the BEA's personal  income estimates 
and population  figures are obtained by interpolating  between bench- 
mark  years.40  The state dummies  remove the cross-sectional  variation 
of the income variable.  Because of the interpolation  procedure,  the re- 
maining  time-series  variation  is just noise; as a result, the estimates are 
not reliable.4' 
Second, as we argued  in the previous  section, income  in the short  run 
is polluted  with noise that  has little to do with its role as a scale variable 
(intended, presumably,  to measure transactions).  The removal of the 
cross-sectional information  (which measures long-run  variation  of in- 
come much more closely) leaves a close-to-meaningless  measure of 
transactions  as the single explanatory  variable. (Note that these two 
criticisms  apply only when the fixed-effects model is used with a very 
short  sample  period.) 
In 1974,  Feige and P.A.V.B. Swamy also estimated  a similar  model 
with random  effects. Unfortunately,  we do not think that their elegant 
38. Hartley  (1966);  Lee (1966);  and  Cohen  (1967). 
39. Feige (1974). 
40. After  1965,  the BEA yearly  estimates  are  not  based  on interpolation,  but  instead  on 
quarterly  reports  from  the State  Employment  Security  Agencies. (Only  dividends,  which 
represent  less than  3 percent  of personal  income,  are  based  on interpolation  of benchmark 
years.)  See the "Sources  and  Methods"  section  of Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (1986). 
41. This point  is not a very significant  criticism  of Feige's excellent study  because he 
was mainly  interested  in cross-price  elasticities.  Writing  his thesis in the early 1960s,  he 
also faced more  data  and  computational  limitations.  In fact, his computing  power  was so 
limited  that he had to divide his model with fixed effects and time effects into five-year 
periods  because  he could  not handle  the entire  sample  at the same  time.  This smaller  time 
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random-effect  model  is the correct  model  to use in estimating  the income 
elasticity  from  panel  data  because it assumes that the expected value of 
the constants  is time-invariant.  As we argued  in the previous  section, we 
think  that the error  term  of the money demand  equation,  which embod- 
ies the unobservable  financial  technology, is both changing  over time 
and correlated  with income over time. The assumptions  of Feige's and 
Swamy's  random-effect  model  do not allow  for the removal  of such cor- 
relation.  Thus  Feige and  Swamy's  estimates  of the income  elasticity  will 
be biased downward  for the same reason as the time-series estimates 
are.42 
Finally, Arthur  Gandolfi  and James  Lothian  ran  panel regressions  of 
money on income and interest rates on demand  and other deposits for 
the period 1929-68.  They used total deposits in commercial  and mutual 
savings  banks  as their  concept of money and  found  that  the slope of the 
money demand  function  was about  1.  343  They made  no attempt  to allow 
for time or geographical  differences  in price levels, banking  laws, or fi- 
nancial sophistication, nor did they consider alternative concepts of 
money. 
The results  described  in this literature  highlight  three  systematic  rela- 
tionships across studies. First, when the econometric specifications 
allow for the cross-sectional variation  to dominate, the estimated in- 
come elasticities are significantly  larger  than one (and always close to 
1.3-1.4).  Second,  when the cross-sectional  variation is removed  from 
the data (with the introduction  of a large number  of regional  dummies, 
with state fixed-effects, or with any other  procedure),  the estimated  in- 
come elasticity falls below one and is always close to 0.9.44  Third, no 
matter  what or how many explanatory  variables  are included, the hy- 
pothesis that  the estimated  income elasticity  is stable  over time is never 
rejected. 
42. Another  reason  not to trust  Feige's and Swamy's  estimates  is that the estimated 
variances associated with some of the (random)  coefficients are negative. Feige and 
Swamy  (1974,  p. 249). 
43. Gandolfi  and  Lothian  (1976,  p. 48). 
44. As we argued  before, the reason  these estimates  are lower is that the number  of 
years  used in the analyses  is rather  small.  We think  that  the income  elasticity  needs to be 
estimated  using  long-run  variation  of income.  This  can be achieved  by using  very long-run 
time-series  data  or by using  cross sections  in which  income  differentials  are quite  persist- 
ent. Because  the authors  in the 1960s  used short  time-series,  every time  they got rid  of the 
cross-sectional  variation  by introducing  large  amounts  of regional  dummies,  they got low 
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Regression Results 
In this section, we present our cross-sectional  money demand  esti- 
mates. We begin  by showing  that  the income elasticity  estimated  from  a 
pooled sample  without  controlling  for any other  variables  is significantly 
larger  than  one. However, we find  substantial  year-to-year  variations  in 
cross-sectional  estimates. In the next section, we add  conditioning  vari- 
ables and find sharper  results. With this equation-our  preferred  ver- 
sion-we  cannot reject stability  of the income elasticity; the estimates 
from individual  cross sections do not differ significantly  from the esti- 
mate for the pooled sample. Estimates for the first and second half of 
the sample are not significantly  different.  Consumption  elasticities are 
remarkably  similar,  although  it is personal  income that  has the most ex- 
planatory  power  for money  demand.  Conclusions  for MX1  carry  over to 
our broader  money concept MX2, at least when conditioning  variables 
are included. 
Cross-sectional  Estimates  of  Univariate Regressions 
Table 2 shows regression estimates of the income elasticities of 
money demand  for five-year  intervals.  The dependent  variable  in all re- 
gressions  is the log of the stock of demand  deposits (MX1)  per capita  in 
year t. The first two columns of results report  the log of per capita in- 
come as the only regressor  in each of the years. Figure  5 plots the annual 
cross-state  income  elasticity  of money  demand  (MX1)  from 1929  to 1990 
for this case. The dashed  line plots the annual  income  elasticities  corres- 
ponding  to the first  column  of results in table 2. The solid line plots the 
annual  income elasticities when we allow for special characteristics  of 
agricultural  states, as discussed below. 
The top entry in the first column of results of table 2 shows that the 
cross-sectional  money  demand  elasticity  for 1930  was 1.26  (s.e. = 0.10). 
Hence not only is the coefficient  significantly  positive, but it is also sig- 
nificantly  larger  than  one. The number  to the right  of the elasticity  is the 
R2, which  in this case is 0.78. The standard  error  of the regression  is 0.26, 
shown in parentheses  below R2.  This good fit can also be seen in figure Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  307 
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Source:  See  appendix  2 for detailed  source  notes.  The  figure plots  the  annual income  elasticities  based  on  the 
regression results obtained in table 1. The dashed line shows the annual income elasticities  with no added conditioning 
variables. The solid line plots the income elasticities  when the log of the share of income originating in the agricultural 
sector is added as a regressor. 
6, which presents scatter diagrams  of (log) personal  income per capita 
versus the (log) of MX1  per capita  in 1930, 1950, 1970,  and 1990. 
As can be seen from the R2  reported  in table 2, the fit is not as good 
for 1990  as it was for 1930,  but it is better than for 1970.45  Figure  7 is a 
scatter diagram  of the log of MX1 per capita and the log of income per 
capita  in all 62 cross sections (from  1929  to 1990)  at the same time. Time 
and state fixed-effects are extracted from each data point to yield an 
impressive  picture  that  clearly  presents  the goodness of fit  of these state 
money demand  equations. The slope of the regression  line in figure  7 
is 1.45. 
For all the years before 1963,  the point estimates  are above one. For 
the period between 1963  and 1980, the point estimate falls below one, 
45. Although  the R2  statistics  of the cross-sectional  regressions  changed  dramatically 
with  time,  the standard  errors  of the regressions  do not change  as much.  Hence, we do not 
report  weighted  least squares  estimates;  the weighted  least squares  (WLS)  elasticities  will 
be very close to the ordinary  least squares  (OLS)  estimates.  For example,  the restricted 
WLS  income  elasticity  estimate  for the second column  of table 2 is 1.30, compared  with 
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Table 2.  Cross-state Regression Estimates of the Income Elasticity of Money 
(MX1) Demand 
With agriculture's  share 
income  Income  Agriculture 
Year  elasticity  R2 [6]  elasticity  coefficient  R2 [f] 
1930  1.26  0.78  1.15  -0.07  0.79 
(0.10)  [0.26]  (0.14)  (0.06)  [0.26] 
1935  1.44  0.74  1.37  -0.04  0.74 
(0.12)  [0.29]  (0.20)  (0.09)  [0.29] 
1940  1.42  0.73  1.33  -0.05  0.73 
(0.13)  [0.31]  (0.19)  (0.08)  [0.31] 
1945  1.31  0.57  1.48  0.08  0.58 
(0.17)  [0.28]  (0.20)  (0.05)  [0.05] 
1950  1.32  0.59  1.50  0.10  0.62 
(0.16)  [0.26]  (0.18)  (0.05)  [0.25] 
1955  1.11  0.45  1.37  0.11  0.49 
(0.18)  [0.27]  (0.22)  (0.05)  [0.26] 
1960  1.14  0.44  1.42  0.11  0.49 
(0.19)  [0.25]  (0.21)  (0.05)  [0.24] 
1965  0.90  0.29  1.20  0.10  0.36 
(0.20)  [0.24]  (0.36)  (0.04)  [0.23] 
1970  0.81  0.24  1.12  0.09  0.31 
(0.20)  [0.22]  (0.24)  (0.04)  [0.21] 
1975  0.91  0.20  1.16  0.10  0.36 
(0.25)  [0.23]  (0.24)  (0.03)  [0.20] 
1980  0.92  0.16  1.26  0.11  0.25 
(0.30)  [0.27]  (0.31)  (0.04)  [0.25] 
1985  1.15  0.38  1.24  0.03  0.37 
(0.21)  [0.22]  (0.24)  (0.04)  [0.22] 
1990  1.31  0.40  1.37  0.02  0.39 
(0.23)  [0.25]  (0.26)  (0.04)  [0.25] 
Source: See appendix  2 for detailed  source  notes. The dependent  variable  is the log of nominal  money  (MXI)  per 
capita.  Data are annual  and by state. Standard  errors  for the explanatory  variables  are shown  in parentheses  below 
the point  estimates.  The standard  errors  for the regressions  are shown in brackets  below R2. A constant  for each 
year  (not shown  in the table)  is estimated  in all regressions. 
but the standard  error  of these estimates  increases substantially.  In the 
first  row of the addendum  to table 2, after  the five-year  intervals  of the 
first  column,  we report  the income  elasticity  when it is constrained  to be 
equal  across all 62 years. The constrained  result  is 1.25  (s.e. = 0.02). The 
low elasticities  in the 1960s  and 1970s  are  reflected  in pooled regressions Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier  Sala-i-Martin  309 
Table 2. (Addendum) 
Income 
elasticity 
Income  wl ag. 
Period  elasticity  share 
Income elasticity constrained  1929-90  1.25  1.31 
over period:  (0.02)  (0.03) 
F  =  1.17a  F  =  0.42a 
1929-59  1.32  1.33 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
1960-90  1.03  1.27 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
F  =  32.84b  F  =  3.15b 
Income elasticity constrained  1930-90  1.26  1.32 
and data pooled over five-year  (0.04)  (0.06) 
intervals:  1930-55  1.33  1.34 
(0.05)  (0.07) 
1960-90  1.03  1.27 
(0.08)  (0.09) 
F  =  8.57c  F  =  0.32c 
Income elasticity  constrained  1929-90  1.45  1.20 
and state effects removed:d  (0.02)  (0.02) 
1947-90  1.36  1.34 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
1960-90  1.59  1.52 
(0.05)  (0.05) 
a. The income  elasticities  are constrained  to be the same  over the periods  shown.  The F-test is based  on the null 
hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on income  are the same  across all 62 years. The 0.05 critical  value with 61 degrees 
of freedom  for the numerator  and more  than 1000  degrees  for the denominator  is 1.32. 
b. The F-test is based  on the null  hypothesis  that the coefficients  on income  are the same  in the two subperiods 
(each subpefiod  includes  thirty-one  years).  The 0.05 critical  value with I degree  of freedom  for the numerator  and 
more  than 1000  for the denominator  is 3.84. 
c. The F-test  is based  on the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on income  are the same  for the two subperiods 
(the  first  subperiod  includes  seven  years  at five-year  intervals  and  the second  includes  six years  at five-year  intervals). 
The 0.05 critical  value for I degree  of freedom  in the numerator  and  more  than  400 for the denominator  is 3.86. 
d. The rows  next to the label  "Income  elasticity  constrained  and state  effects removed"  report  income  elasticities 
and  their  standard  errors  when  a constant  is estimated  for each state, as well as for  each year, while  a single  income 
elasticity  is estimated.  As above, coefficients  on agriculture's  share  are not restricted  over time. 
that exclude the Depression-War  period. For the period 1947-90 (not 
shown in table 2), our restricted  estimate  is 1.10  (s.e. = 0.03). 
One of the key questions asked in the money demand  literature  is 
whether  the elasticity  of money  demand  is stable  over time. Here we ad- 
dress  part  of that  question:  the stability  of the income  elasticity  of money 
demand.  Testing  the null  hypothesis  that  the constrained  coefficients  on 
income are constant across the 62 years, we find that the F-statistic is 310  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
Figure  6. State Cross  Sections  of Money  (MX1)  and Personal  Income  per Capita, 
Various  Years 
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Source: See appendix  2 for detailed  source  notes. 
1.  17.4  We cannot reject the hypothesis that the income elasticity has 
been stable  over the long sample  period 1929-90.47  If we restrict  the first 
31 years of the sample  to have the same coefficient  on income, the esti- 
mate  is 1.32  (s.e. = 0.03). The corresponding  constrained  coefficient  for 
the second 31-year  subperiod  is 1.03  (s.e. = 0.04). A test of the hypothe- 
46. The  restricted  estimates  of the elasticity  and  standard  errors  when  we use informa- 
tion over five-year  intervals  (13 time-series  data  points)  coincide  up to the third  decimal 
point  with  those we get when  we use all  the available  information.  This  suggests  that  serial 
correlation  is not likely  to be a problem. 
47. The 10  percent  critical  value is 1.24. The null  hypothesis  cannot  be rejected  even 
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Figure  7. State  Cross  Sections  of Money  (MX1)  and Personal  Income  per Capita, 
1929-90 
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Source: See appendix  2 for detailed  source notes. The slope of the regression  line for 62 cross sections  over 48 
states is 1.45.  Both series  are corrected  for state effects and time effects. 
sis that  the two subperiods  have identical  income elasticities  is rejected 
at the 5 percent level of confidence. (The F-statistic is 32.84 and the 
5 percent  critical  value is 3.84.) 
We noted above that the income data before 1965  were constructed 
by interpolating  estimates at approximately  five-year intervals. This 
suggests  that  the yearly observations  do not provide  independent  infor- 
mation  on the money demand  function. We reestimated  our pooled re- 
gressions  using data at five-year  intervals  only. The restricted  estimate 
for the entire  period  is 1.26  (s.e. = 0.04). The estimate  for the first  half  of 
the sample  period  is 1.33  (s.e. = 0.05)  and  the estimate  for  the second half 312  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
is 1.03 (s.e. = 0.08). The hypothesis that the two coefficients are the 
same is rejected. (The F-statistic is 8.57 and 5 percent critical  value is 
3.86.) Our  main  result  is that  the estimates  of income  elasticities  with no 
conditioning  appear  to be unstable. 
Adding Some  Conditioning  Variables 
Consider  the individual  elasticities in the first  two columns  of results 
in table 2. Notice that the point estimates for the 1960s  and 1970s  are 
smaller  than the rest. This is the main  reason for rejecting  the stability 
hypothesis. One reason why the elasticities in the 1960s  and 1970s  are 
smaller  could be that  the introduction  of financial  technologies  follows a 
slow process of regional  diffusion. Hence in any given year, different 
states may  enjoy different  degrees  of financial  sophistication.  To the ex- 
tent that the high-income  states tend to implement  those technologies 
faster (perhaps  because they are urban  states where it pays banks  to in- 
troduce the technological innovations more quickly, or perhaps be- 
cause, when wages are higher,  it is more costly for people to go to the 
bank),  the coefficients  on income would tend to be biased  downward. 
AGRICULTURAL  SHARES.  To assess this possibility,  we introduce  an 
additional  regressor:  the log of the share  of income  originating  in the ag- 
ricultural  sector. We believe that the process of diffusion of financial 
technologies is likely to start  in urban  areas and slowly extend to rural 
areas. We expect to find, therefore,  a positive association  between the 
agricultural  shares  (which  we call AGRY)  and demand  deposits. 
Time-series  studies have traditionally  dealt with changes in the de- 
gree of financial  sophistication  by positing an inverse relationship  be- 
tween the degree of financial  sophistication  in a given region and its 
amount of agricultural  activity. James Tobin has argued that as the 
United States moved out of agriculture  in the late 19th  and early 20th 
centuries,  the nation  became  more  financially  sophisticated  and  that  this 
trend caused a steady shift in money demand.48  However, Tobin and 
others have argued  that the omission of a financial  sophistication  vari- 
able  would  bias income  elasticity  estimates  upward,  because in poor ag- 
ricultural  areas, the "money  economy"  was limited  in scope.  49 
The last set of regressions  in table 2 report  estimates  of income elas- 
48. Tobin  (1965). 
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ticity when we have introduced  as an explanatory  variable  a state's agri- 
cultural  activity as a proxy for its financial  sophistication.  We find  that 
only one of 62 estimates  of the income elasticity is now below one-the 
point estimate for 1934-while  only three fall below 1.1. We also find 
that  the agricultural  share  is statistically  insignificant  between 1929  and 
1950. In 1950, it starts having a significantly  positive effect on the de- 
mand  for money.  The positive  association  between  AGRY  and  MX1  dis- 
appears  in the 1980s.  Under the hypothesis  of slow technological  diffu- 
sion, this would suggest that between 1950 and 1980, a process of 
financial  innovation occurred that moved slowly from urban to rural 
areas. Hence other things being equal, rural  states tended to demand 
relatively  more  money over this period. 
The  introduction  of AGRY,  however, increases  the point  estimates  of 
the income elasticity  for the periods  when the elasticity was previously 
below one. (Compare  with the results  from  the first  two columns  of table 
2.) This, again,  is consistent with the concept of slow regional  diffusion 
of technology  as a source of bias in the univariate  regressions.  Once we 
correct  for this bias, the estimates of the income elasticity move up to 
their  true  values. 
In the addendum  to table 2, the restricted  elasticity when AGRY is 
included  is 1.31  (s.e. = 0.03), significantly  larger  than  one. The F-statistic 
is now 0.42. Thus the hypothesis  of a stable income elasticity  cannot  be 
rejected, even at the 10 percent significance  level. Dividing  the sample 
period  into two subsets of equal size and  restricting  the elasticities  to be 
the same within subsamples  yields an estimate of 1.33 (s.e. = 0.03) for 
the  period  1929-59  and 1.27  (s.e. = 0.04)  for 1960-90.  The  hypothesis  that 
the elasticities are the same across the two 31-year  periods cannot be 
rejected.  (The F-statistic  is 3.15 and the 5 percent  critical  value is 3.84.) 
Reestimating  the pooled regressions  at five-year  intervals  yields a re- 
stricted  elasticity of 1.32 (s.e. = 0.06). The elasticities for the two sub- 
periods  are 1.34  (s.e. =0.07) for 1930-55  and 1.27  (s.e. = 0.09) for 1960- 
90. Again, an F-test of the hypothesis that the elasticities are the same 
across the two thirty-year  subperiods  cannot  be rejected  at the 5 percent 
level of confidence. (The F-statistic is 0.32 and the 5 percent critical 
value is 3.86.) 
Thus the main  result is that once we hold constant what we think is 
a proxy for the degree of financial  development,  the income elasticities 
appear  to be very stable over the entire  sample  period  of 1929-90. 314  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
POPULATION  DENSITY.  Another possible measure of urbanization 
is the population  density of a state. When  we looked at population  den- 
sity as an explanatory  variable,  it did not seem to have an important  ef- 
fect on the estimates we reported  in table 2. For instance, when we in- 
cluded  it along  with agriculture's  share  of income, we found  it to be not 
significantly  different  from  zero in most of the 62 years.50  The restricted 
income  elasticity  was 1.36  (s.e. = 0.03), compared  with 1.36  (s.e. = 0.03) 
when density  is excluded. Furthermore,  our  previous  results  for agricul- 
tural  shares  do not change  when density is included:  agricultural  shares 
have statistically  positive coefficients  in the 1950s, 1960s,  and 1970s. 
The only individual  years for which the density variable seems to 
make  a substantial  difference  are the last five years of the sample, 1986- 
90. Density has smaller  but perceivable  effects in 1938-40  and 1970-74. 
The solid line in figure  8 plots the yearly income elasticities  when popu- 
lation density is excluded. The dashed line represents the estimates 
when density is included.  The two lines follow each other in an almost 
perfect  fashion  until  1985.  After  that, the elasticities  we found  when den- 
sity was included  were substantially  smaller  and not significantly  differ- 
ent from one. The maximum  difference  between the two estimates oc- 
curs in 1990. Hence running  a single cross section for 1990  will reveal 
that the income elasticity is not different  from 1.0. This, however, does 
not happen  for any other year before 1985.  A cross-state regression  for 
the early 1970s  might also yield a point estimate between 1.0 and 1.1. 
However, figure  8 shows that  such a result  does not depend  on the inclu- 
sion of population  density. 
This finding  is significant  in the light  of Julio  Rotemberg's  comments 
on this paper.  Rotemberg  runs  a single  cross-section  regression  for 1990 
and  includes  a measure  of urbanization  as an explanatory  variable  in the 
money demand  regression.  He finds  that, by including  urbanization,  the 
estimated  income  elasticity  falls below one. We do not have his measure 
of urbanization,  but  we suspect that  it is highly  correlated  with  our mea- 
sure  of population  density. As a result, we suspect that  if he tried  to run 
his regression  for other  years, he would  also find  that  the income  elastic- 
ity is unchanged.  Furthermore,  if he constrained  the elasticity  to be the 
same for all periods, we suspect that he would find an estimate of 1.36 
and  would  be unable  to reject  stability  of the income  elasticity  over time. 
50. The null  hypothesis  that  all the coefficients  on population  density  are zero can be 
rejected  in a regression  of MX1  on time  effects, personal  income,  and  population  density. 
(For  personal  income,  a single  income  elasticity  is estimated.) Casey B. Mulligan  and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  315 
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Source: See appendix  2 for detailed  source  notes. The figure  plots  the annual  income  elasticities  using  the authors' 
regression  results.  The solid line plots the log of nominal  money  (MX  I) per capita  as the dependent  variable  and  the 
log of income per capita  and agriculture's  share  of income  as explanatory  variables.  The dashed  line is similarly 
specified,  but includes  population  density  as a third  explanatory  variable. 
STOCK OF POPULATION.  As  we  argued above, the aggregation of 
families  and firms  into states implies that state population  is a relevant 
variable. When we included state population in the money demand 
equation  with agriculture's  share  of income, we found  that  the estimated 
income elasticities  and their stability  tests were not substantially  differ- 
ent from those reported  in table 2 when agriculture's  share of income 
was included.  We also found  that  the coefficient  on the log of population 
was fairly stable over time: close to 0.  1. We have not displayed these 
results  because they are similar  to those shown in table 2. 
Other Geographical  Differences  in Financial  Sophistication 
and Institutional  Arrangements 
It could be argued  that New York City, a major  world  financial  cen- 
ter, may be distorting  our estimates of the income elasticity. It is true 
that  New York State has relatively  more demand  deposits per capita (a 
large  fraction  of which are owned by non-New Yorkers)  than the other 316  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
47 states. It is also true  that  for some of the years included  in our  sample, 
New York was also among  those states with the highest per capita in- 
come in the country. Hence, New York could be considered  an outlier 
that  biases our  point  estimates. 
We reestimated  all the regressions  in table 2, excluding  New York, 
and  found little difference  in our original  estimated  elasticity or the sta- 
bility  of the coefficients  over time. For  instance,  the restricted  point  esti- 
mate when we include the agricultural  share (excluding  New York) is 
1.26 (s.e.=0.02),  while with New  York, we found a value of  1.31 
(s.e. = 0.03). Here the F-statistic is 0.96, well below the 5 percent crit- 
ical value of 1.32. The F-statistic  in this case is 1.20, again  below the 5 
percent critical value. Thus our conclusions about the magnitude  and 
stability  of the income elasticity are not driven  by the influence  of New 
York State. 
STATE  FIXED-EFFECTS.  New York  may not be the only state whose 
deposits could be considered  "unusual"  given its income. Other  states 
besides New York  may specialize  in banking.  Others  may  have peculiar 
banking  laws. To the extent that  such  phenomena  persist,  their  influence 
on our estimated  income elasticity can be removed  by estimating  state 
fixed-  effects in a pooled regression.  Even if the phenomena  are not per- 
fectly constant  over time, a comparison  of estimated  income  elasticities 
in pooled regressions  with and  without  state effects should  indicate  how 
our estimated  elasticities  compare  qualitatively  to the true  elasticity. 
The last part of the addendum  to table 2 labeled "income  elasticity 
constrained  and state effects removed"  reports the restricted  income 
elasticities  and  their  standard  errors  when state dummies  are added  to a 
pooled regression  of MX1 on personal  income and time dummies.  The 
income elasticity is 1.45 (s.e. = 0.02) in the full sample. Notice that this 
is an increase  over the corresponding  estimate  without  state  effects, 1.25 
(s.e. = 0.02). The same is true  for later samples. The 1947-90  pooled re- 
gressions (not reported)  also exhibit  an increase  in the income elasticity 
from 1.10 to 1.36 when state effects are added. Furthermore,  the post- 
war period  is more  like the full sample  period  when the state effects are 
estimated.51  The introduction  of state effects also produces  a higher  in- 
come elasticity  in the 1960-90  period, 1.59  (s.e. - 0.05). 
51. The 1980s  are infamous  in monetary  economics, but they do not drive  our  finding 
of an income  elasticity  above 1.0. We ran,  but did not report,  a pooled  regression  that  in- 
cludes only the 1950s,  1960s,  and 1970s  and  estimates  state and time  effects. The income 
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We also introduced  state effects into the pooled regressions, which 
include  agriculture's  share  of income as an explanatory  variable.  In the 
full sample  period,  the introduction  of fixed state effects reduced  the es- 
timated  income  elasticity  from 1.31  to 1.20.  This small  reduction  appears 
to reflect  a reduction  in the first  half  of the sample  period. For the 1947- 
90 period, the estimated  income elasticity increases slightly (1.34 with 
state effects, and 1.33 without them). For the 1960-90  period, the esti- 
mates with state effects are much  higher  (1.52)  than  those without  state 
effects (1.27). 
The  inclusion  of state effects can be seen as a test of the claim  that  our 
estimates  reflect  supply  rather  than  demand  for deposits. Some analysts 
have claimed that states specializing  in banking  hold large amounts  of 
deposits for out-of-state  agents (firms  and families). To the extent that 
these states tend to have higher  incomes, our income elasticities would 
be biased upward.  Under this view, the introduction  of state dummies 
will tend to correct  for the initial  omission, so the income elasticities  es- 
timated  with fixed-effects  will be closer to the true elasticities. That  is, 
they will tend to be lower. In five of the six cases shown in table 2, the 
introduction  of state effects increases our elasticity estimates. Thus we 
conclude that ignoring  geographical  differences  in financial  sophistica- 
tion, institutional  arrangements,  or price  levels leads to income  elasticit- 
ies that  are too small. 
The Choice  of a Scale  Variable: Consumption or Income? 
We now use retail sales as a measure  of consumption  to analyze an 
alternative  scale variable.  N. Gregory  Mankiw  and Lawrence  Summers 
estimate  time-series  money demand  equations  and  argue  that  consump- 
tion is a better  scale variable  than  income  because it more  accurately  re- 
flects permanent  income.52 
As we mentioned  in the first  section, the Census  ofRetail Trade  is not 
conducted  every year. In order  to achieve comparability,  the first  set of 
regressions  reported  in table  3 uses the log of personal  income  per  capita 
as the scale variable  for the years  for which  retail  sales are available.  As 
we found  in table  2, the coefficient  is stable  over the entire  sample,  with 
a restricted  estimate  of 1.28  (s.e. = 0.04). The F-statistic  is 1.4, below the 
5 percent critical value of  1.79. The second set of  regressions in 
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Table  3.  Comparing  Income  and Consumption  Elasticities  for MX1 
Income  Consumption 
Year  elasticity  R2 [6]  elasticity  R2  [2  ] 
1929  1.37  0.83  1.46  0.69 
(0.09)  [0.22]  (0.14)  [0.30] 
1935  1.44  0.74  1.25  0.55 
(0.12)  [0.29]  (0.17)  [0.39] 
1939  1.39  0.72  1.28  0.53 
(0.13)  [0.30]  (0.17)  [0.39] 
1948  1.38  0.57  1.24  0.50 
(0.17)  [0.26]  (0.18)  [0.29] 
1954  1.16  0.47  1.39  0.48 
(0.18)  [0.27]  (0.21)  [0.27] 
1958  1.19  0.44  1.39  0.43 
(0.19)  [0.26]  (0.23)  [0.26] 
1963  1.00  0.36  1.28  0.36 
(0.19)  [0.24]  (0.25)  [0.24] 
1967  0.90  0.28  1.21  0.36 
(0.21)  [0.24]  (0.29)  [0.23] 
1972  0.90  0.26  0.81  0.08 
(0.21)  [0.21]  (0.35)  [0.23] 
1977  0.82  0.15  0.41  0.01 
(0.27)  [0.24]  (0.36)  [0.26] 
1982  1.11  0.28  0.65  0.27 
(0.25)  [0.23]  (0.34)  [0.05] 
1989  1.33  0.46  0.86  0.12 
(0.21)  [0.24]  (0.32)  [0.31] 
Addendum 
Elasticities  1.28  ...  1.26  ... 
constrained  (0.04)  ...  (0.06)  ... 
F  =  1.40  ...  F  =  1.14  ... 
Source: See appendix  2 for detailed  source  notes. The dependent  variable  is the log of nominal  money  (MXI)  per 
capita. Data are annual  and by state. Standard  errors  for the income  and consumption  elasticities  are shown in 
parentheses  below  the point  estimates,  while  the standard  errors  for the regressions  are shown  in brackets  below  R2. 
A constant  for each year is estimated,  but not reported.  The first set of regressions  includes  the log of personal 
income  per capita  as the only regressor.  This regression  differs  from  the first  regression  of table  2 because  here we 
include  only the years for which  retail  sales are available,  to achieve comparability.  The second set of regressions 
uses retail  sales as its only regressor  and as its proxy  for consumption.  The F-test is based on the null hypothesis 
that  the coefficients  on income  and  consumption  are the same  across  the 12  subperiods.  It follows  an F-distribution. 
The 0.5 percent  critical  value with  eleven degrees  of freedom  is 1.79.  The 10 percent  critical  value is 1.58. 
table 3 substitutes  consumption  (using  the log of retail sales per capita 
as a proxy)  for personal  income as the scale variable.  The consumption 
elasticity is estimated  to be above one for all periods before 1972.  The 
point  estimate  falls and the standard  error  increases  after  that  date. The 
restricted point  estimate  over  the  entire  sample  period is  1.26 
(s.e. = .06). A test of the stability  of the coefficients  fails to reject  the hy- Casey B. Mulligan  and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  319 
pothesis that they are stable  over time. Hence consumption  also seems 
to be a good scale variable. 
A key question  posed by Mankiw  and Summers  is which of the two 
scale variables  fits the data  better.53  We can answer  this question  by put- 
ting  both explanatory  variables  in the same  regression.  If we restrict  the 
coefficients  of both consumption  and  income over time (not shown), we 
find that the coefficient on income is 1.30 (s.e. = 0.08) and the one on 
consumption  is not significant  (-0.03,  s.e. = 0.10). Mankiw  and Sum- 
mers  found  the opposite  result. 
A Broader Definition of Money 
Table  4 reproduces  table  2, except that  the dependent  variable  is MX2 
(total deposits), rather  than MX1 (demand  deposits). The first  two col- 
umns of results in the main  part  of table 4 show the univariate  relations 
between the log of total deposits per capita and the log of personal  in- 
come per capita.  Figure  9 plots the cross-state  income  elasticity  for total 
deposits (MX2) from 1929 to  1990. The coefficients, plotted as the 
dashed line in the figure, fluctuate  between 1.51 for 1935  and 0.34 for 
1983.  The restricted  point  estimate  is 1.24  (s.e. = 0.02), which is statisti- 
cally different  from  one. The F-statistic  for the test of stability  of coeffi- 
cients is 2.52, higher  than  the 5 percent  critical  value of 1.32. 
As shown in the addendum  to table 4, a restricted  estimate over the 
subperiod  1929-59  yields an elasticity of 1.34 (s.e. = 0.02). The corres- 
ponding  numberfor  the subperiod  1960-90  is 0.87 (s.e. = 0.04). An F-test 
of the hypothesis  that  the elasticities  are the same over the two subperi- 
ods is rejected at all sensible levels of confidence. (The F-statistic is 
99.28 and  the 5 percent  critical  value is 3.84.) 
Reestimating  the elasticities using only data at five-year intervals 
yields a restricted  value of 1.24  (s.e. = 0.04)  for the entire  sample  period. 
Dividing  the sample  into two subperiods  of 30 years yields an estimate 
of 1.35 (s.e. = 0.04) for the subperiod  1930-55  and 0.89 (s.e. = 0.09) for 
the subperiod  1960-90.  An F-test of the equality  of elasticities  across the 
two subperiods  is clearly  rejected.  (The  F-statistic  is 22.29  and  the 5 per- 
cent critical value is 3.86.) Thus the univariate  cross-sectional regres- 
sions from  MX2  are not stable  over time. 
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Table  4.  Cross-state  Regression  Estimates  of the Income  Elasticity  of Money 
(MX2) Demand 
With  agriculture's  share 
Income  Income  Agriculture 
Year  elasticity  R2 [a]  elasticity  coefficient  R2  [2] 
1930  1.27  0.88  1.27  -0.00  0.87 
(0.07)  [0.19]  (0.10)  (0.05)  [0.26] 
1935  1.51  0.83  1.39  -0.06  0.83 
(0.10)  [0.24]  (0.16)  (0.07)  [0.24] 
1940  1.39  0.80  1.27  -0.06  0.80 
(0.10)  [0.25]  (0.15)  (0.06)  [0.25] 
1945  1.32  0.63  1.43  0.05  0.63 
(0.15)  [0.24]  (0.17)  (0.05)  [0.24] 
1950  1.31  0.69  1.45  0.08  0.71 
(0.13)  [0.21]  (0.14)  (0.04)  [0.20] 
1955  1.12  0.54  1.40  0.11  0.59 
(0.15)  [0.23]  (0.18)  (0.05)  [0.22] 
1960  1.16  0.52  1.42  0.11  0.57 
(0.16)  [0.22]  (0.18)  (0.04)  [0.21] 
1965  1.06  0.37  1.37  0.10  0.44 
(0.20)  [0.24]  (0.22)  (0.04)  [0.23] 
1970  0.82  0.23  1.29  0.13  0.38 
(0.21)  [0.23]  (0.23)  (0.04)  [0.21] 
1975  0.97  0.20  1.21  0.09  0.32 
(0.27)  [0.24]  (0.26)  (0.04)  [0.23] 
1980  0.66  0.08  1.05  0.12  0.22 
(0.30)  [0.27]  (0.30)  (0.04)  [0.25] 
1985  0.40  0.02  0.83  0.14  0.17 
(0.28)  [0.29]  (0.30)  (0.05)  [0.27] 
1990  0.85  0.14  1.11  0.08  0.18 
(0.29)  [0.31]  (0.32)  (0.05)  [0.31] 
Source: See appendix  2 for detailed  source notes. The dependent  variable  is the log of nominal  total deposits 
(MX2)  per  capita.  Data  are  annual  and  by state.  Standard  errors  for  the  explanatory  variables  are  shown  in parentheses 
below the point  estimate.  The standard  errors  for the regressions  are shown in brackets  below R2. A constant  for 
each date is estimated  in all regressions,  but is not reported. 
The second set of regressions  in table  4 includes  the agricultural  share 
(AGRY)  as an explanatory  variable.  All the point estimates  for income 
elasticity  with  AGRY  lie above one, except for five (1983-87).  As shown 
in the addendum  to table  4, the restricted  coefficient  is 1.30 (s.e. = 0.02) Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier  Sala-i-Martin  321 
Table 4.  (Addendum) 
Income 
elasticity 
Income  wl ag. 
Period  elasticity  share 
Income elasticity constrained  1929-90  1.24  1.30 
over period:  (0.02)  (0.02) 
F =  2.52a  F =  0.63a 
1929-59  1.34  1.34 
(0.02)  (0.03) 
1960--90  0.87  1.21 
(0.04)  (0.05) 
F  =  99.28b  F  =  6.50b 
Income elasticity  constrained  1930-90  1.24  1.36 
and data pooled over five-year  (0.04)  (0.06) 
intervals:  1930-55  1.35  1.21 
(0.04)  (0.10) 
1960-90  0.89  1.31 
(0.09)  (0.05) 
F  =  22.29c  F  =  1.64c 
Income elasticity  constrained  1929-90  1.45  1.14 
and state effects removed:d  (0.02)  (0.03) 
1947-90  1.14  1.10 
(0.04)  (0.04) 
1960-90  1.30  1.32 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
a. The income  elasticities  are constrained  to be the same  over the periods  shown.  The F-test is based  on the null 
hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on income  are the same  across all 62 years.  The 0.05 critical  value with 61 degrees 
of freedom  for the numerator  and more  than 1000  for the denominator  is 1.32. 
b. The F-test is based  on the null hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on income  are the same in the two subperiods 
(the first subperiod  includes  31 years and the second includes  30 years). The 0.05 critical  value with I degree  of 
freedom  for the numerator  and more  than 1000  for the denominator  is 3.84. 
c. The F-test is based  on the null  hypothesis  that the coefficients  on income  are the same  for the two subperiods 
(the  first  sub-period  includes  seven  years  at five-year  intervals  and  the second  includes  six years  at five-year  intervals). 
The 0.05 critical  value for I degree  of freedom  in the numerator  and more  than  400 for the denominator  is 3.86. 
d. The rows next to the label  "income  elasticity  constrained  and state effects  removed"  report  income  elasticities 
and  their  standard  errors  when  a constant  is estimated  for each state, as well as for each  year, while  a single  income 
elasticity  is estimated.  As above, coefficients  on agriculture's  share  are not restricted  over time. 
and  the F-statistic  is 0.63. Hence the hypothesis  that the MX2  elasticity 
is 1.30  for the years 1929-90  cannot  be rejected. 
The pooled estimate  of the income elasticity over the first  31 years is 
1.34 (s.e.=0.03)  and the estimate over the second 31 years is  1.21 
(s.e. = 0.05). An F-test of the equality  of these two estimates  is rejected 322  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure 9.  Cross-state Income Elasticity for Total Deposits (MX2), 1929-90 
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Source:  See appendix 2 for detailed source notes. The figure plots the annual income elasticities  using the regression 
results from table 4,  where  the dependent  variable is the  log of nominal total deposits  per capita.  The dashed  line 
shows  the income  elasticities  with no added conditioning variables.  The solid line plots the income  elasticities  when 
the log of the share of income originating in the agricultural share is added as a regressor. 
at the 5 percent level (the F-statistic is 6.50 and the 5 percent critical 
value is 3.84). When  data  at five-year  intervals  are  used, the pooled esti- 
mates  are 1.36  (s.e. = 0.06)  for the entire  sample;  1.21  (s.e. = 0.10)  for the 
1930-55  period;  and 1.31 (s.e. = 0.05) for the 1960-90  period. An F-test 
of the equality  of the elasticities  across the two subperiods  cannot  be re- 
jected at the 5 percent (or 1 percent)  level. (The F-statistic  is 1.64 and 
the 5 percent  critical  value is 3.86.) 
As was the case for MX1, the income  elasticity  for our  broad  measure 
of money appears  to be remarkably  stable  over the entire  sample  period 
of 1929-90. 
The inclusion  of state effects does not have a systematic  effect on the 
estimated  MX2  income elasticity. The final  rows of the addendum  to ta- 
ble 4, labeled  "income  elasticity  constrained  and  state  effects removed," 
display  the estimated  income elasticities  and  their  standard  errors  when 
state effects are included  in addition  to time effects. In the full 1929-90 
sample, the elasticity increases from 1.24 to 1.45 when state dummies 
are added to the pooled regression. However, the elasticity decreases Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  323 
Table 5.  Comparing Income and Consumption Elasticities for MX2 
Income  _  Consumption 
Year  elasticity  R2 [a]  elasticity  R2 [a] 
1929  1.47  0.89  1.22  0.83 
(0.11)  [0.17]  (0.13)  [0.21] 
1935  1.52  0.86  1.09  0.78 
(0.15)  [0.22]  (0.16)  [0.27] 
1939  1.49  0.85  1.21  0.79 
(0.14)  [0.21]  (0.15)  [0.25] 
1948  1.49  0.73  1.47  0.76 
(0.13)  [0.191  (0.12)  [0.18] 
1954  1.47  0.67  1.56  0.69 
(0.15)  [0.20]  (0.16)  [0.19] 
1958  1.52  0.62  1.63  0.65 
(0.18)  [0.20]  (0.18)  [0.19] 
1963  1.48  0.55  1.63  0.54 
(0.20)  [0.21]  (0.22)  [0.21] 
1967  1.36  0.45  1.52  0.44 
(0.23)  [0.22]  (0.26)  [0.22] 
1972  1.29  0.36  1.07  0.14 
(0.26)  [0.22]  (0.40)  [0.26] 
1977  1.10  0.25  0.58  0.06 
(0.29)  [0.23]  (0.38)  [0.26] 
1982  1.07  0.24  0.52  0.07 
(0.32)  [0.26]  (0.38)  [0.29] 
1989  1.17  0.19  0.99  0.07 
(0.32)  [0.31]  (0.39)  [0.33] 
Addendum 
Elasticities 
constrained  1.42  ...  1.27  ... 
(0.04)  ...  (0.08)  ... 
F  =  0.53  ...  F=  1.91  ... 
Source: See appendix  2 for detailed  source notes. The dependent  variable  is the log of nominal  total deposits 
(MX2)  per capita. Data are annual  and by state. Standard  errors  for the income  and consumption  elasticities  are 
below the point  estimates,  while  the standard  errors  for the regressions  are shown  in brackets  below R2.  A constant 
for each year  is estimated,  but  not reported.  The  first  set of regressions  includes  the log of personal  income  per  capita 
as the only regressor.  The second  set of regressions  uses retail  sales as its regressor  and  as a proxy  for  consumption. 
All regressions  in this  table  use agriculture  shares,  the  log  of population  levels,  and  a constant  as additional  explanatory 
variables;  however,  these results  are not reported.  The F-test  is based  on the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficients  on 
income  and consumption  are the same  across the twelve subperiods.  It follows an F distribution.  The 0.05 critical 
value with eleven degrees  of freedom  is 1.79.  The 10  percent  critical  value is 1.58. 
from 1.30 to 1.14 when the dummies  are added to the second set of re- 
gressions. A similar  pattern  occurs in the postwar  period. State effects 
increase  the estimated  elasticity  in both sets of regressions  for the 1960- 
90 period. 
Table  5 replicates  table 3 to incorporate  consumption  into the analy- 
sis of MX2.  The first  two columns  of results  report  the individual  cross- 324  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
sectional  regressions  when personal  income is used as a scale variable. 
The years  used correspond  to the years  for which  the consumption  vari- 
able is available.  Because we rejected  the hypothesis of stability  of the 
income coefficients  in the univariate  case (the first set of regressions  in 
table 4), we estimated  each regression  with the agricultural  shares and 
the population variables. All the point estimates of the elasticity of 
money with  respect to income are larger  than  one. The restricted  coeffi- 
cient is 1.42 (s.e. = 0.04). The hypothesis that the elasticities are stable 
over time cannot  be rejected  at the 5 percent  level. 
The second set of regressions  in table  5 repeats  the exercise with con- 
sumption  as the relevant  scale variable.  The conditioning  variables  and 
the time  periods  are otherwise  identical  to those in the first  set of regres- 
sions. The point estimates for the consumption elasticity are signifi- 
cantly  larger  than  one for  every year  until 1977.  The  point  estimate  drops 
below one in 1977  and  remains  below one throughout  the 1980s.  The re- 
stricted  estimate is 1.27 (s.e. = 0.08), but the F-statistic  is 1.91, slightly 
above the 5 percent  critical  value of 1.79. Hence the stability  of the con- 
sumption  elasticity  for MX2 (total  deposits)  is rejected. 
When  both  consumption  and  income  are  introduced  in the same  panel 
set, the restricted  point estimate  for income is 1.37 (s.e. = 0.16) and the 
one for consumption  is  -0.03  (s.e. = 0.17). Hence income, not con- 
sumption,  fits the data better as the scale variable  in the MX2 demand 
equation. 
Policy Conclusions  and Directions for Future Research 
We found  four main  empirical  results. First, the income elasticity of 
both MX1 and MX2 has been surprisingly  stable for an impressive  pe- 
riod that includes the Great  Depression, World  War  II, the oil shocks 
of the 1970s, and the Reagan-Volcker  years. Second, the estimates of 
elasticity for the entire period are substantially  higher  than unity (be- 
tween 1.3 and 1.4) for both measures  of money. Given the small size of 
the standard  errors, these elasticities are significantly  larger  than one. 
Third, insofar as we can determine, the relevant scale variable is in- 
come, not consumption.  Our  estimated  consumption  elasticities, how- 
ever, do not differ  greatly  from those for personal  income. Finally, the 
inclusion of state effects in addition  to time effects did not change our Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  325 
finding  of an  income  elasticity  that  is larger  than  one. Thus  we are  skepti- 
cal that  geographical  differences  in the level of the money demand  func- 
tion, which could arise  because some states have peculiar  banking  laws 
or because some states specialize  in banking,  are responsible  for our  re- 
ported  high  income elasticities. 
Our  finding  of such a high  income elasticity is not new. In 1959,  Mil- 
ton Friedman  argued  that U.S. secular trends in real balances and in- 
come during  the 1870-1954 period suggested an income elasticity of 
1.8.  In his discussion  of his somewhat  unconventional  estimate, Fried- 
man noted that an elasticity estimated using higher frequency data 
(which tend to yield estimates close to one) would suffer  from two bi- 
ases. First, to the extent that money demand  depends  on permanent  in- 
come, income  elasticities  are  biased  downward.  Our  results  suggest  that 
the quantitative  importance  of this bias is likely to be minimal  because 
"income  elasticities"  and "consumption  elasticities"  are quite similar. 
Even if the bias is important,  our conclusion that the income elasticity 
is greater  than  one is only strengthened. 
Second, to the extent that money balances  absorb  transitory  income 
fluctuations,  elasticities estimated with high-frequency  data will be bi- 
ased upward.  Friedman  offered the conjecture  that such effects would 
be important  only at very high  frequencies,  not at annual  frequencies.55 
Our  results provide  two more pieces of supporting  evidence. First, de- 
mand  deposits may have been an important  "shock  absorber"  50 years 
ago, but by the 1980s, technological  advances should have motivated 
people to absorb  shocks with other assets, such as savings accounts or 
money market  funds. If the shock absorber  bias were ever important, 
technological  advances should  have the effect of reducing  the bias and 
introducing  a downward  trend in the income elasticity. However, we 
54. Friedman  (1959).  It is interesting  that Friedman  (1959,  p. 208)  and Friedman  and 
Schwartz  (1963,  p. 639)  cite Feige's cross-state  regressions  as evidence in favor  of a high 
income elasticity (greater  than 1.0). They also mention  that studies for other countries 
have also found high  income elasticities.  Tobin (1965)  criticized  the 1.8 estimate  on the 
grounds  that it is driven  by a downward  trend  in velocity during  the 1867-1903  period, 
which  resulted  from changes  in U.S. financial  structure.  Friedman  and Schwartz  (1982, 
p. 243)  remove  that trend  and obtain  an income elasticity  of 1.2. However, because the 
revised  estimate  was not based  on any  data  on "financial  structure,"  the revision  may  have 
been  too severe. 
55. Friedman  (1959)  also noticed  that  a "shock  absorber"  explanation  is difficult  to rec- 
oncile with  the business-cycle  behavior  of income  and  real  balances. 326  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
found  the income elasticity remarkably  stable over the 1929-90  period. 
If anything,  after  taking  account  of state effects, it appears  higher  in the 
postwar period. Second, the tendency to absorb transitory income 
shocks should  be even greater  for broader  definitions  of money; the up- 
ward shock absorber  bias should be stronger  for MX2 than for MX  1. 
However, we estimated very similar  income elasticities for MX1 and 
MX2. If anything,  the MX2 elasticity was lower! Thus we do not think 
that  our high  income elasticities  are a statistical  artifact. 
Policy  Implications 
Our  results suggest  a number  of implications  for rules  for conducting 
economic policy. First, some economists, such as Benjamin  Friedman 
and Kenneth  Kuttner,  have cited instability  of time-series  equations  in 
order  to argue  the "money  demand"  is not a structural  relationship  that 
can  be relied  upon  by the monetary  authorities.56  They use these findings 
to argue  against  targeting  of monetary  aggregates.  While  our results do 
not address the overall stability of the demand for money, they do 
suggest that the unstable  income elasticities reported  by Friedman  and 
Kuttner  may well be statistical artifacts  arising  from the use of time- 
series data  and the omission of measures  of the financial  technology. 
Second, our results have implications  for those who would pursue 
money growth  rules. For example, Milton  Friedman's  constant money 
growth  rule  would  not achieve price stability  if based on the unit  income 
elasticity  most  economists  believe to be true. If per  capita  output  growth 
proceeds  at 2 percent  a year, a 0.5 underestimate  of the income  elasticity 
would result in 1 percent a year deflation  instead of the intended  price 
stability-an  outcome that could have undesirable  political and eco- 
nomic  consequences. 
Third, our finding  that income and not consumption  is the relevant 
scale variable  may have implications  for Keynesian  fiscal policy analy- 
sis. Mankiw  and  Summers  argue  that  if consumption  is the relevant  scale 
variable, then a tax hike could have expansionary  effects if the con- 
sumption  elasticity  of money demand  were large  enough.57 
If we compared  our large estimates of the consumption  elasticity of 
money demand  with the rest of the parameters  of the IS-LM  model  used 
56. Friedman  and  Kuttner  (1992). 
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by Mankiw  and  Summers,  we would  conclude  that, in  fact, tax increases 
are expansionary.  The problem  is that our results also suggest that in- 
come-not  consumption-is  the relevant scale variable. In the frame- 
work  used by Mankiw  and Summers,  this implies  that  tax increases are 
unambiguously  contractionary.  The quantitative  effects of such tax in- 
creases will also be altered  by our empirical  findings:  high elasticity of 
money demand  suggests that the LM curve is steeper than previously 
thought.  This means that-in  a Keynesian world-fiscal  policy is less 
potent. 
A Research  Challenge 
Our  high estimates  of the income elasticity of money demand  pose a 
challenge  for economists. Milton  Friedman  insisted  that  an income  elas- 
ticity  greater  than  unity  was difficult  to reconcile  with  transactions  theo- 
ries of money demand.  He proclaimed  that "it is dubious  that there has 
been any secular increase in the ratio of transactions  to income."58  If 
Friedman  is correct, then we need a theory of money demand  that pre- 
dicts that real balances are highly sensitive to the volume of transac- 
tions.59 
We conclude  with two conjectures  for explaining  the high  elasticities 
we have estimated. Our first explanation depends on demographic 
changes  at the household  level.60  At the family  level, economies  of scale 
exist in the use of money:  larger  families  tend to use less money  per per- 
son than smaller  ones. Hence, if children  are an inferior  good while di- 
vorce is a luxury  good (as seems to be the case), higher  income  is associ- 
ated with smaller  families  and larger  demand  for money. It follows that 
the income elasticity  is larger  than  one. 
Second, the process of economic development  is associated with a 
larger  number  of vertically  disintegrated  firms  (using  more  complicated 
technologies  with more varieties  of inputs  and interacting  with a larger 
number  of suppliers).  To the extent that firms  need money to transact 
with other firms,  but not for internal  transactions,  a higher  level of in- 
come will be associated with a more  than  proportionally  higher  level of 
money  demand. 
58. Friedman  (1959,  p. 136). 
59. Friedman's  story  was that  monetary  services  are  a luxury  good. 
60. See Becker  (1991)  for discussions  of demographics,  economics,  and  the  family. 328  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
APPENDIX  1 
Bias Introduced by Differences in Regional 
Interest Rates 
BARRO,  MANKIW,  AND  SALA-1-MARTIN  (1992)  argue  that  perfect capital 
mobility  is consistent with regional  differences  in income if some assets 
cannot be used as collateral.  In particular,  they identify  human  capital 
as a possible noncollateralizable  asset. 
Econometric  theory allows an upper bound on the bias to be com- 
puted. First, suppose that a state's income, yi, is a Cobb-Douglas  func- 
tion of its capital  stock, ki, and a productivity  parameter,  Ai: 
yi=  Aik,i 
Interpret  capital  ki broadly  to include not only physical capital, but hu- 
man capital. Using standard  analysis of omitted variable  bias, the for- 
mula for the bias is 8(1  -  a)/a when the productivity  parameter  A is 
cross-sectionally uncorrelated  with income. If productivities  and in- 
comes are positively correlated,  8(1  - a()/Ia  is an upper  bound. Using a 
cross section of the 48 states, Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1991)  argue  that 
in order  to explain  the slow speed  of convergence  across states, the capi- 
tal share  cannot  be smaller  than  0.8. (Of course, this would include  hu- 
man  capital  and other kinds  of inputs  that can be purposefully  accumu- 
lated.) If open-economy considerations are taken into account, the 
capital share needs to be closer to 0.9; see Barro,  Mankiw,  and Sala-i- 
Martin  (1992). 
If an interest  rate elasticity of 8  =  0.5 and a capital  share  of (x =  0.8 
is chosen, the implied  bias is 0.125. Lower interest rate elasticities or 
higher  capital  shares  reduce the bias. (A higher  capital  share  allows for 
less cross-sectional  variation  of interest  rates.) Finally,  an offsetting  ef- 
fect that  tends to reduce  the bias includes  the productivity  level, Ai. 
If, following  Barro,  Mankiw,  and Sala-i-Martin,  we think  that this is 
why we should  not assume  a constant  interest  rate  across states, then  we 
should keep in mind  that the underlying  theory of money demand  may 
be along  the following  lines: people go to the bank  and  exchange  human 
capital  (which, admittedly,  is not a very liquid  asset) for money so they 
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APPENDIX  2 
Detailed Source Notes for Figures and Tables 
Figures  1 and 2. Authors'  calculations  based on U.S. Department  of 
Commerce (1975, pp. 1002-03); Economic Report of the President 1991, 
pp. 302 and 373; Economic Report of the President 1981, p. 236; Fried- 
man and Schwartz (1963, pp. 712-22); Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(1986); Survey of Current Business  (various issues);  FDIC, Bank Oper- 
ating Statistics  (various issues);  FDIC, Assets,  Liabilities  and Capital 
Accounts  of Commercial and Mutual Savings  Banks (various issues); 
FDIC,  Banks and Branches  Data  Book (various issues);  FDIC,  Data 
Book, Operating Banks and Branches (various issues); FDIC, Statistics 
on Banking  (various  issues); Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve 
System (1959). 
Figures  3-7 and 9. Authors' calculations  based on U.S. Department 
of  Commerce (1975, pp.  1002-03); Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 
pp. 712-22); Bureau  of Economic Analysis (1986);  Survey of Current 
Business  (various issues);  FDIC, Bank Operating Statistics  (various is- 
sues);  FDIC, Assets,  Liabilities  and Capital Accounts  of Commercial 
and Mutual Savings Banks (various issues); FDIC, Banks and Branches 
Data  Book (various issues);  FDIC,  Data  Book,  Operating Banks and 
Branches (various issues); FDIC, Statistics on Banking (various issues); 
Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System (1959). 
Figure  8. Same as figures  3-7 and 9, but also including  Statistical  Ab- 
stract of the United States 1990, p. 195; U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Cur- 
rent Population Reports (various issues). 
Table  1. Same as figures  1 and 2, but also including  p. 378 of the Eco- 
nomic Report of the President,  1991. 
Tables  2 and 4. Authors' calculations  based on U.S. Department  of 
Commerce  (1975,  pp. 1002-03);  Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963,  pp. 712- 
22); U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis (1986);  Survey  of Current  Busi- 
ness (various issues); FDIC, Bank Operating Statistics  (various issues); 
FDIC, Assets,  Liabilities and Capital Accounts of Commercial and Mu- 
tual  Savings  Banks  (various  issues);  FDIC,  Data  Book,  Operating 
Banks and Branches (various issues); FDIC, Banks and Branches Data 
Book (various issues); FDIC, Statistics on Banking (various issues); 
Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System (1959). 
Tables  3 and 5. Same as tables 2 and 4, but also including  Statistical 
Abstract of the United States (various issues). Comments 
and Discussion 
N. Gregory Mankiw: Casey Mulligan  and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  have 
written  an intriguing  report.  Examining  an age-old  question  with  a novel 
data set, they reach a surprising  conclusion: the income elasticity of 
money  demand  is greater  than  one. In my comments,  I will  address  three 
questions. First, assuming  that their  conclusion  is correct, what are the 
implications  for policy? Second, assuming  that their conclusion is cor- 
rect, can it be reconciled with standard  theories of money demand? 
Third,  is their  conclusion  correct? 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR POLICY.  When  we are  told that  the income elas- 
ticity of money demand  is greater  than one, should we care? Should it 
change  our view about  the conduct  of monetary  or fiscal  policy? 
For most practical  purposes, the answer is no: the income elasticity 
of money demand  is not a pressing  issue for macroeconomic  policy. Of 
course, as all good undergraduates  know, the income elasticity of 
money demand  does affect the slope of the LM curve, which in turn 
affects the impact  of fiscal policy, holding  the money supply constant. 
Yet this exercise has limited  practical  significance.  We ask our students 
about  such hypothetical  policy experiments  so they can develop facility 
with the models  we teach. But in the world,  in contrast  to the textbooks, 
the money supply  is almost  never held constant. 
To put  the point  bluntly,  I doubt  that  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Alan 
Greenspan  loses much  sleep over the parameters  of the money-demand 
function.  The Federal  Reserve  can conduct  a reasonably  good monetary 
policy without thinking  much about what determines  the demand  for 
money. For example,  it can use the interest  rate  or the monetary  base as 
the short-term  instrument  and nominal  GDP  as the medium-term  target. 
By adjusting  the instrument  as the economy  deviates  from  the target,  the 
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Federal  Reserve  can avoid  major  recessions or inflations,  without  know- 
ing the deep parameters  governing  money demand. 
Although  real-world  policymakers  do not care much about parame- 
ters such as the income elasticity of money demand,  these parameters 
are of some interest to academics. We use these estimates to calibrate 
models  in order  to consider  alternative,  hypothetical  rules  for monetary 
policy. And we use them  to evaluate  our theories  of money demand. 
RECONCILIATION  WITH  THEORY.  Probably the  best  theory of 
money  demand  we have is the Baumol-Tobin  model. This  model  implies 
an elasticity of money demand  with respect to expenditure  of one-half, 
holding  other variables  constant. The findings  in Mulligan's  and Sala-i- 
Martin's  report  might  be interpreted  as decisive rejections  of the Baum- 
ol-Tobin  model. 
Yet the implications  of the Baumol-Tobin  model are more flexible 
than is often suggested. In the world, one variable  that is not constant 
over time or across states is the fixed cost of making  a trip  to the bank. 
Rather  than  being a fixed dollar  cost, as is usually  assumed, it is plausi- 
bly a fixed time cost. That is, a trip to the bank may require  a certain 
amount  of time, so the dollar  cost of a trip  depends  on the wage, which 
in the long  run  is roughly  proportional  to income  and  expenditure.  In this 
case, the Baumol-Tobin  model implies an income elasticity of one, 
rather  than  one-half. 
It is even possible to modify  this argument  to reconcile the Baumol- 
Tobin  model  with the findings  in this report.  If the labor-supply  curve is 
backward-bending-as it may be in the long run-then  income and ex- 
penditure  move less than proportionately  with the wage. Conversely, 
the wage, and  thus the cost of a trip  to the bank,  move more  than  propor- 
tionately  with income and expenditure.  In this case, the Baumol-Tobin 
model  yields an income elasticity  of money demand  greater  than  one. 
One can also raise the income elasticity in the Baumol-Tobin  model 
by incorporating  capital  income taxation. Under a progressive  income 
tax, higher income leads to a higher marginal  tax rate, which in turn 
leads to a lower after-tax  interest  rate. Since money demand  is interest- 
elastic, the result is an increase in the effective income elasticity of 
money  demand. 
Finally, a larger  income elasticity could arise because not all house- 
holds face the same before-tax interest rate. Low-income households 
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to credit-card  companies  or the local loan shark.  Thus the return  on the 
alternative  asset to demand  deposits might vary across poor and rich 
households. Because these differences  are not measured,  they may be 
reflected  in a larger  estimated  income elasticity. 
The bottom  line is that  the Baumol-Tobin  model can yield a larger  in- 
come elasticity than  is generally  supposed. From  the standpoint  of the- 
ory, the results  presented  in this report  are not as surprising  as they first 
seem. 
OTHER  EVIDENCE.  Let me now turn to the central  issue: is the in- 
come elasticity of money demand  in fact larger  than one, as this paper 
argues? 
Most of the past empirical  work on money demand  has used aggre- 
gate time-series  data. It is easy to be skeptical  of this work, however, 
for much  of it does not take the identification  problem  seriously. To the 
extent that the Federal Reserve has ever targeted  the money supply, 
shifts in money demand  are correlated  with income. For example, posi- 
tive residuals  in the money-demand  function, such as those in the early 
1980s,  lead to contractionary  shifts  in the LM curve  and  thus reductions 
in income. The induced correlation  between the residual and income 
tends to bias estimates  of the income elasticity. 
One of the best attempts  to address  this identification  problem  is in a 
paper  by Miquel  Faig published  several years ago.  ' Faig  uses the identi- 
fying assumption  that the money-demand  function does not shift over 
the seasons. Thus the seasonal fluctuations  in income can be used to 
identify  the income elasticity. Faig finds  that money balances  fluctuate 
much  less than  income  over the seasonal  cycle, implying  an income  elas- 
ticity much  smaller  than  one. 
Faig  also finds  that  consumption  is a better  scale variable  than  income 
in the money-demand  function. In some countries, such as Germany, 
consumption  and income have quite different  seasonal patterns. Faig 
shows  that the  seasonal pattern of  money balances more closely 
matches  that  of consumption. 
Mulligan  and Sala-i-Martin,  like Faig, use a plausible  assumption  to 
solve the identification  problem. They assume that cross-state differ- 
ences in income are not correlated  with state-specific  shifts in the mon- 
ey-demand  function. Yet they reach the opposite conclusion:  they find 
an income elasticity significantly  greater  than  one. 
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Table 1. Cross-sectional  Money  Demand  Estimates 
Specification  and result  Regression I  Regression  2  Regression  3  Regression  4 
Estimation  OLS  IV  IV  OLS 
Instruments  ...  Education  State dummies  ... 
Number  of observations  2,865  2,865  2,865  2,762 
Constant  0.52  -0.52  3.31  0.61 
(0.32)  (0.83)  (1.26)  (0.30) 
Log(income)  0.58  0.68  0.30  0.19 
(0.03)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.03) 
Log(wealth)  ...  ...  ...  0.36 
(0.02) 
Source: Estimates  are based  on the 1983  Survey  of Consumer  Finances  conducted  by the Survey  Research  Center 
of the University  of Michigan.  The variables  used are B3401  for demand  deposits, B3201  for income, B3324  for 
wealth,  B4505  for education,  and  B3121  for state. Standard  errors  are shown  in parentheses.  The dependent  variable 
is the log of demand  deposits.  OLS stands  for ordinary  least squares.  IV stands  for instrumental  variables. 
So who is right?  After my first  reading  of this report,  I thought  that  it 
might  be possible to reconcile  these disparate  pieces of evidence. I con- 
jectured that wealth was the key missing  variable.  Suppose, for exam- 
ple, that  money  demand  is positively  related  to both income  and  wealth, 
and  that  the sum of the elasticities  equals  one. Consider  what  happens  if 
we incorrectly  leave out wealth  and estimate  only an income elasticity. 
Clearly,  the estimated  income  elasticity  is biased  upward  because of the 
positive correlation  between income and wealth. But the extent of the 
bias depends on the data set. Over the business cycle or the seasonal 
cycle, wealth  moves less than  proportionately  with income, so the esti- 
mated  income elasticity would be less than  one. Yet, because wealth is 
more concentrated  than  income, wealth  could move more than  propor- 
tionately with income in cross-state data. This could explain an esti- 
mated  income  elasticity  larger  than  one. 
To address  this possibility, I turned  to yet another  data set, the 1983 
Survey of Consumer Finances.2  My goal in looking at cross-sectional 
household  data  was to estimate  separate  wealth  and  income  elasticities. 
What  I found  was very different  from  what I had  expected. 
I began  by trying  to confirm  the finding  in this paper. In regression 1 
in table 1, I report  a regression  of the log of the total checking  account 
balance  on the log of total income. To my surprise,  I found an income 
elasticity only slightly larger  than one-half. Moreover, because of the 
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large  number  of observations,  the standard  error  is small,  so an elasticity 
of one or higher  is decisively rejected. 
At first, I thought  the problem  was measurement  error.  Perhaps  my 
income data  are contaminated  with so much  error  that my coefficient  is 
substantially  biased toward  zero. So in regression  2, I instrumented  in- 
come with years  of schooling.  The estimated  coefficient  does rise, as the 
measurement-error  hypothesis  predicts, but the estimate  of 0.68 is still 
significantly  below one. 
Next,  I thought that perhaps there was something special about 
grouping  people into states. So in regression  3, I used state dummies  as 
instruments.  This regression should, I thought, be close to those re- 
ported  by Mulligan  and Sala-i-Martin.  But again, the estimated  income 
elasticity  is significantly  below one. 
Why are these results from household  data so different  from the au- 
thors'  results  from  aggregate  state  data?  I do not know  for sure. One  pos- 
sibility  is that  the discrepancy  comes from  the treatment  of out-of-state 
bank accounts. If I hold a checking account in a New York bank, my 
money  is considered  New York  money  in the authors'  data,  even though 
I live, earn  my living, and spend my money in Massachusetts.  If out-of- 
state banking  were random,  then it would merely add noise to the left- 
hand-side variable, without biasing the estimates. Yet if out-of-state 
bank  accounts  tend to be in high-income  states, then money will appear 
to more  closely associated  with income than  it really  is. 
The magnitude  of this problem  is hard  to judge. The problem  might 
be severe for business holdings  of demand  deposits. Business banking 
might  be concentrated  near  corporate  headquarters,  which  tend to be in 
large  cities, which  tend  to be in high-income  states. If so, this would  bias 
upward  the estimated  income elasticity in the authors'  aggregate  state 
data. 
For completeness,  I report  in the last column  of table I the regression 
that  originally  drew  me to these data. Here we find  that  money holdings 
are significantly  related  to both income and wealth. One interpretation 
of this regression  is that  both income and wealth  are proxies for perma- 
nent  income or consumption. 
To sum up, I am not yet ready to accept the conclusion that the in- 
come elasticity  of money demand  is larger  than  one. I would  first  like to 
see all the conflicting  evidence resolved. Fortunately,  the Federal Re- 
serve need not wait for the resolution.  The size of the income elasticity 
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Julio J. Rotemberg: The estimation  of the empirical  relationship  be- 
tween the amount  of liquidity  that people want to hold and its determi- 
nants  using  time-series  data  is subject  to a serious  endogeneity  problem. 
If the money supply  is held constant  and money demand  rises, standard 
models imply  that output  should  fall and interest  rates should  increase. 
Thus a correlation  exists between the residual in the money-demand 
equation  and the two right-hand-side  variables.  This problem  could be 
held in abeyance if the money-demand  relation  were miraculously  ex- 
empt from the instability  that plagues most stochastic relations  among 
aggregate  variables.  Of course, it is not. 
This  instabilityistobeexpected.  Supposethat,  as  manymodelspredict, 
increasing  money  demand  while  holding  the money  stock constant  raises 
interest  rates  and  lowers  output.  It  then  seems  very  hard  to  imagine  that  the 
stochastic  relation  among  these three  variables  would  be constant. The 
reason is that Federal Reserve operating  procedures vary over time. 
Changes  in Federal Reserve operating  procedures  affect the degree to 
which an increase  in money demand  is matched  by either  an increase  in 
money  or  an  increase  in  interest  rates  . Therefore,  changes  in these proce- 
dures  affect  the  degree  to which  the  residual  in  traditional  money-demand 
equations  is correlated  with  the  right-hand-side  variables. 
The resulting  lack of believable  estimates  of the parameters  of money 
demand  is a terrible  loss for macroeconomics.  It means  that  we have no 
credible  empirical  model in which nominal  magnitudes  matter.  Thus I 
want  to applaud  Casey Mulligan  and  Xavier  Sala-i-Martin  for making  an 
attempt  to uncover  money-demand  parameters  from  some other  source. 
I also think  that, more  specifically,  looking  at the cross-sectional  rela- 
tion  between  money  and  income  makes  sense. Cross-sectional  evidence 
cannot be used to estimate the effect of exogenous changes in interest 
rates  on money  demand;  however, the relationship  can  be observed  with 
income. The big advantage  of this relationship  is that, cross-sectionally, 
there  is no a priori  reason  to expect any correlation  between  income  and 
the residual  in the money-demand  equation. By contrast, in the aggre- 
gate, we expect money-demand  increases that are not fully accommo- 
dated by increases in the money stock to lower income. This negative 
correlation  between the residual and income might well bias the esti- 
mated  income elasticities  downward.  From  this perspective,  one would 
expect the correct  income  elasticity  to be larger  than  the one obtained  in 
typical  time-series  studies-and  this paper  does indeed estimate larger 
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The authors  estimate this elasticity to be around 1.3. The extent to 
which this is significantly  higher  than one is a bit oversold. It is signifi- 
cantly higher than one for very few individual  years. Pooling all the 
years is a bit problematic  because it is not clear that  one is getting  inde- 
pendent observations. In other words, serial correlation  exists in the 
state-specific  error term. Nonetheless, the fact that this coefficient is 
bigger  than one is interesting  and challenging  to the conventional  wis- 
dom. In fact, I regard  the coefficient  as so high  as to be implausible. 
Money is rate-of-return-dominated  and no safer  than  interest-paying 
government  obligations,  so that it is probably  held only for the transac- 
tions services it provides. It seems unlikely  that the volume of transac- 
tions rises more  than  proportionately  to income. Nor does it seem likely 
that  more  than  twice the money  is needed  to carry  out two times  as many 
transactions.  Rather,  the reverse is almost certainly  true. One reason, 
stressed by William  Baumol and James Tobin, is that one can avoid 
holding  twice the money balances  by carrying  out financial  transactions 
more  often. Similarly,  on large  transactions,  it is beneficial  to find  ways 
of carrying  out the transaction  that may have larger fixed costs, but 
which avoid the need to hold money. The costs of holding  money are 
proportional  to the amount  of money  held, whereas  the costs of financial 
transactions  are not as sensitive to the size of the transaction.  So, as 
more  funds  are involved, incurring  fixed costs of carrying  out more  and 
more complex transactions  becomes more attractive.  Along the same 
lines-and  this is of particular  relevance  cross-sectionally-individuals 
and firms  that carry  out many transactions  find it advantageous  to pay 
fixed costs to hold credit  cards and special types of accounts  that allow 
them  to hold  fewer demand  deposits. 
Mulligan's  and  Sala-i-Martin's  estimates  are implausible  as estimates 
of money demand  elasticities, which prompts  the question  of what they 
might  be estimating.  My instinct  is that, to a large  degree, the estimates 
reflect  the elasticity  of the supply  of banking  services with  respect  to the 
income of the state. To see what I have in mind, start with a parable. 
Consider  a town surrounded  by a fertile  agricultural  region.  Income  per 
capita  will probably  be measured  as being  higher  in town. In part,  this is 
because the agricultural  produce  that is consumed  by producers  is not 
counted as income. But mainly  the difference  in per capita income re- 
flects the fact that skilled  professionals  live in town. Also, it seems rea- 
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town. Why this is so is an interesting  question. It must mean  that there 
are  some sort  of increasing  returns  to banking  or that  there  are  externali- 
ties from other factors that are located in town. Whatever  the case, if 
these two conditions  are met, then a regression  of per capita  deposits on 
per capita  income  will have a huge  coefficient. 
The problem  is that banks are agglomerated  in cities. The authors 
would  probably  reply  that  they are looking  at a coarser  level of aggrega- 
tion and  that  each state has at least one bank.  This does not fully resolve 
the  problem  because  banks  provide  many  different  services;  certain  cus- 
tomers  require  services that can be provided  only by large  banks. That 
is why we talk of financial  centers. The authors  were clearly aware of 
this problem  because they did two things. First, they redid  their  regres- 
sions, taking  out New York. This does indeed  lower their  estimated  co- 
efficient-but  not by enough to make it plausible. Second, the authors 
ran  regressions  controlling  for population  density in the state. They re- 
port  that  this does not change  the results. The  problem  is that  population 
density  is a very crude  measure  of the degree  to which a state is a finan- 
cial center for its surrounding  area. Several poor southeastern  states, 
such as Kentucky (with 94 persons per square mile in 1990)  and West 
Virginia  (with 74) are denser than Texas (with 64); nonetheless, Texas 
has far more  important  cities and  financial  centers. 
Using the data  that  the authors  have kindly  supplied,  I have also con- 
sidered  two exercises along  these lines. The first  is to rerun  their  regres- 
sions, but  only for those states that, in 1991,  did  not include  cities whose 
size equals  or exceeds that  of Boston, a financial  center  that  I know well. 
In particular,  I have used the 33 states that do not contain  a city whose 
population  is larger  than  Boston. (Texas has three such cities.)1  The co- 
efficient falls substantially.  Using M to denote the log of per capital 
money and Y  to denote the log of per capita  income, the regression  for 
the 1990  data  is 
M=  4.13  +  1.038 Y. 
(0.78)  (0.277) 
The other thing  I have done is to add an additional  explanatory  vari- 
able: the fraction  of the state's population  that lives in a "metropolitan 
area,"  as defined  by the Census Bureau. This fraction  varies between 
1. Data  on city population  and  state  densities  come from  the WorldAlmanac  (1992). 338  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
100  percent for New Jersey and 22 percent for Vermont.2  This has an 
even more  dramatic  effect on the results. Using 1990  data  for money and 
income and  letting U86  be the 1986  data  for urbanization  yields 
M =  4.65  +  0.739  Y +  0.006  U86. 
(0.78)  (0.286)  (0.002) 
One interesting  aspect of these regressions  is that my measure  of ur- 
banization  and  income  are  not very highly  correlated;  the standard  error 
on income  does not rise very much  when urbanization  is included.  Both 
variables  are statistically  significant,  although  the urbanization  variable 
is more  strongly  correlated  with money than  the income variable. 
These results are not confined  to 1990.  I have rerun  these equations 
with the authors' 1970  data, including  their agricultural  share variable. 
(Without  this variable,  the income coefficient  is only 0.9.) This yields 
M=  5.44  +  1.122 Y+  0.009AGR. 
(0.26)  (0.236)  (0.04) 
Excluding  those states that include at least one major  city in 1991,  this 
regression  becomes 
M=  5.68  +  1.014 Y+  0.12 AGR. 
(0.24)  (0.216)  (0.03) 
Using the data  for all states, but adding  the urbanization  variable  yields 
M =  5.54  +  1.035 Y+  0.003  U72 +  0.12 AGR. 
(0.33)  (0.259)  (0.002)  (0.04) 
So, once again,  the exclusion of urban  states or the inclusion  of a crude 
measure  of urbanization  reduces the coefficient  on income. 
I am not claiming  that  either  of these regressions  adequately  controls 
for the supply  effect of financial  agglomeration  on deposits. In fact, nei- 
ther  variable  makes  Delaware  an important  financial  center;  Wilmington 
is a small  city and  only 66  percent  of Delaware's  population  is in a metro- 
politan  area. On the other hand,  Delaware  is a place where deposits are 
large. In both 1940  and 1990,  its level of deposits per capita  was second 
only to that  of New York. Perhaps  Delaware  has such an unusually  high 
level of deposits because so many companies are incorporated  in this 
2. Data  on percent  of the state's population  in a metropolitan  area  comes from 
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state. However, this is a source  of agglomeration  for which  my variables 
do not control. 
One  piece of evidence that  deposits are held  by out-of-state  residents 
(and  thus  correspond  to out-of-state  income)  comes from  firms'  financial 
statements.  The Standard and Poor's Register  of Corporations, Direc- 
tors, and Executives  lists the main  bank  of many  companies.  According 
to this publication,  Ben and Jerry's, a fairly large ice-cream company 
located in Vermont,  used Marine  Midland  Bank of New York in 1991. 
Demonstrating  that I, too, live in a financial  center, the Register shows 
that  First  Mutual  of Boston was the main  bank  of Tom's of Maine,  which 
makes new-age toiletries and is located in Kennebunk. Out-of-state 
banking  is not the exclusive province  of small  and new companies.  The 
Boise Cascade  corporation,  which is a Fortune  500 company  and is lo- 
cated in Boise, Idaho, uses Bank of America  of California  as its main 
bank. Thus the income earned  by this company's employees, which is 
classified  as Idaho income, corresponds  to banking  that takes place in 
California.  It is thus not surprising  that deposits are a larger  fraction  of 
California's  income  than  they are of Idaho's  income. 
In conclusion, I find  the authors'  basic result interesting.  However, 
I would  emphasize  its relationship  with the supply  of financial  services, 
instead  of emphasizing  its connection  with the demand  for money. 
General Discussion 
Several participants  suggested that although cross-sectional data 
avoid some of the simultaneity  problems  present  in time-series  analysis, 
cross-sectional  analysis  has its own difficulties.  Christopher  Sims  noted, 
as an example,  that  business activity and  hence demand  for money may 
vary with income across states in a different  way than it varies with in- 
come over time. Hence the cross-sectional  elasticities may carry  very 
little information  about the relationship  between income and the de- 
mand  for  money  over time. He also argued  that  an identification  problem 
arises because of the differences in money supply schedules across 
states. Historically,  bank  regulations  have differed  substantially  across 
states, leading  to significant  differences  in regional  interest  rates. More- 
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Sims also believed that the evidence that the income elasticity of 
money  demand  is significantly  greater  than 1.0  is weaker  than  suggested 
in the paper. Even in the authors'  preferred  equation,  the coefficient  is 
not significantly  greater  than 1.0  in 10  of the 13  cross-sectional  equations 
reported.  Furthermore,  he argued  that  the standard  errors  in the pooled 
regressions  are understated.  The theory  used to conclude  that the large 
standard  errors  for individual  cross sections become much smaller  in 
pooled regressions  assumes no correlation  of error  terms across years. 
This implies that the estimated  elasticities for cross sections are inde- 
pendent  across years. The figures  show that this is very far from  being 
true. 
Robert  Hall questioned  the validity  of focusing on demand  deposits 
alone, noting that many alternative  ways of holding  liquid  assets exist 
and that innovations  in the financial  sector have increased  the number 
and  quality  of those alternatives  over time. William  Brainard  agreed,  ob- 
serving that the relationship between income and transactions has 
changed  dramatically  over time. As an example, he cited the fact that 
the ratio of bank debits to GDP has tripled since 1975. While an in- 
creased  volume  of financial  transactions,  at a given level of income, may 
have increased  the demand  for money, innovations  such as the use of 
sweep accounts by large  firms  that maintain  zero checking  balances at 
the end of each day have reduced the demand.  Hall suggested making 
further  use of available  data  by distinguishing  between  personal  and  cor- 
porate  deposits. He pointed out that while most people hold very little 
cash, the national  average  of currency  per capita  is $2000.  This implies 
that relatively  few people hold large  idle cash balances. The same may 
be true  with demand  deposit accounts. Hence Hall argued  that  the find- 
ing of the paper  is actually  that  those who happen  to hold  large  balances 
live disproportionately  in states with high  per capita  incomes. 
William  Nordhaus  questioned  whether  the inclusion  of farm  income 
provided  a suitable  representation  of the importance  of financial  sophis- 
tication.  He suggested  that  it would  have been desirable  to include  vari- 
ables that might serve as proxies for the volume of financial  market 
transactions  or that measure the volume of sales, rather than value 
added. Casey B. Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-Martin  341 
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